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Efficient Restrictions of Trade in the EU Law of the Internal Market: Trust, 
Distrust and the Nature of Economic Integration 
 
Ioannis Lianos 
 
Introduction 
 
 The tension between the “integration”-focused cosmopolitanism of the 
European project and communautarian understandings of the common good, as 
these have evolved in the context of the nation-state, has always been inherent in the 
evolution of the European Internal Market1. Its source lies on the wide variety of 
citizens’ and consumers’ preferences that national regulation aims to satisfy, 
compared to the relatively narrow scope of what has been considered as the core of 
the Internal Market project: to constitute “an area without internal frontiers in which 
the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance 
with the provisions of the Treaties”2. The objective pursued by the Internal Market 
project has always been perceived to be the unfettered movement of products and 
services as well as that of factors of production, such as labour and capital, between 
Member States.  
This functional definition of the Internal Market objective missed nevertheless 
an important dimension of its perceived contribution to the wider political project of 
European integration, as this was clearly spelled out in the Schuman Declaration, 
and later described in the preamble of the Treaty of the EC (TEC): to “lay the 
foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”. Such a narrow 
definition did not integrate adequately the Internal Market within the array of other 
objectives followed by the Community, and the European Union (EU), formulated in 
the preamble of the constitutive treaties and given legal texture in former Article 2 
                                                 
 Reader in European Union law and Competition law, Faculty of Laws, University College London 
(UCL). 
1
 For an historical overview of the development of the Internal Market, see, Laurence W. Gormley, 
‘The Internal Market : history and evolution’, in Niamh Nic Shuibhne (ed.), Regulating the Internal 
Market (Cheltenham :Edward Elgar, 2006), pp. 14-28. ; Paul Craig, ‘The evolution of the single 
market’, in Catherine Barnard & Joanne Scott (eds.), The Law of the Single European Market : 
Unpacking the Premises (Oxford : Hart Publishing, 2002), pp. 1-40. 
2
 Article 26(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Ex Article 14 of the 
Treaty of the European Communities (TEC). 
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TEC3. It is clear that the political necessity of completing the “common market” in 
schedule led to a detached (from other objectives) and mostly functional 
interpretation of the negative and positive market integration provisions of the Treaty. 
All attention was dedicated to the task of removing “existing barriers” to integration. 
Indeed, the European Commission and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) had no 
intention to gamble their newly acquired political capital by challenging directly 
national understandings of the common good. Technocracy and loyalty to the 
completion of the specific task of removing barriers to trade was the winning strategy, 
especially if the task was broad enough to extend their capacity to act. The objective 
was not to look democratic but technocratic. The decoupling of the economic 
dimension (a matter for experts or problem-solvers) from the social sphere 
(considered as a terrain for the “political” and mostly the generalists’ playground) was 
the cornerstone of the technocratic approach. Insulating the Internal Market project 
from popular political pressure preserved the capacity of the European Institutions to 
affirm their independence and perform their task of eliminating barriers to trade 
quietly and without scandal.  
The task followed by the European institutions in establishing the Internal 
Market was, however, far from being secluded to the economic dimensions of the 
European integration project. “Non-market values” or “public interest objectives” have 
always been present, not only in Internal Market related EU legislation4, but also in 
the various derogations to the free movement provisions of the Treaty5. Nonetheless, 
the narrative of economic integration was profoundly inspired by the imagery of the 
removal of national barriers to trade and paid little attention to other values. This 
oversight has certainly been one of the main reasons for the uneasiness created by 
the expansionist application of the negative integration provisions of the Treaty by the 
                                                 
3
 Article 2 TEC: “The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and an 
economic and monetary union and by implementing common policies or activities referred to in 
Articles 3 and 4, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious, balanced and sustainable 
development of economic activities, a high level of employment and of social protection, equality 
between men and women, sustainable and non-inflationary growth, a high degree of competitiveness 
and convergence of economic performance, a high level of protection and improvement of the quality 
of the environment, the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and economic and social 
cohesion and solidarity among Member States”. 
4
 Stephen Weatherill, ‘Supply and demand for Internal Market regulation : strategies, preferences and 
interpretation’, in Niamh Nic Shuibhne (ed.), Regulating the Internal Market (Cheltenham :Edward 
Elgar, 2006), pp. 29-60, at 52 ; Bruno de Witte, ‘Non-market values in Internal Market legislation’, in 
Niamh Nic Shuibhne (ed.), Regulating the Internal Market (Cheltenham :Edward Elgar, 2006), pp. 61-
86. 
5
 Catherine Barnard, ‘Derogations, Justifications and the Four Freedoms : Is State Interest Really 
Protected ?’, in Catherine Barnard & Okeoghene Odudu (Oxford : Hart Publishing, 2009), 273-305. 
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Court in the area of goods as well as by the proposal of the Services directive6, both 
met with the battle-cry of the “erosion of national sovereignty”.  
These difficulties essentially lie on the narrowness of the conception of 
“economic integration” that remains dominant in the sphere of the Internal Market. 
Integration has been equated to the elimination of barriers to free movement or the 
potential restriction of interstate trade. There is no need for elaborate analysis to 
understand the hollowness of this approach. In the national context, public authorities 
often adopt measures that suppress the possibility of trade: licences, bans on sale or 
use, inspections, registration, authorisation or licensing requirements, various sorts of 
prohibitions. Their aim is to satisfy the “preferences” of their citizens and/or the 
consumers on a high degree of environmental protection, the promotion of the 
cultural heritage of the community, to ensure public health and respond to market 
failures such as informational asymmetry in the case of consumer protection7. Public 
authorities also recognize that the promotion of trade has positive effects on 
allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency: consumers should be able to purchase 
products or services at the lowest prices and benefit from a wider consumer choice 
and innovative products/services. The aim of public authorities in this context is not to 
promote trade but to promote efficient trade. I take a broad view of efficiency and I 
consider that it reflects a state of affairs where the preferences of the specific 
community are satisfied, whatever these preferences might be. 
If we transpose the same regulatory problem at the EU context, one could run 
to a number of difficulties. The first is to determine the actors, whose preferences 
should be considered. This might take place at the individual level: a regulation will 
be efficient if it reflects the preferences of every one affected, directly or indirectly, by 
it, which will be close to a Pareto efficiency standard. The aggregation might take 
place at the level of the community: nation-state or the EU level (a Kaldor-Hicks 
standard). The result might be different in each circumstance, but the constant is that 
a restriction of trade can be efficient, unless the promotion of trade is the only value 
pursued by the entity (the value of trade). This is not the case at the national level, 
but what about the EU level? 
                                                 
6
 Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on services in the Internal 
Market [2006] OJ L 376/76. 
7
 The term “preference” refers to how people rank or order states of the world. 
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The value of (inter-state) trade has certainly a particular significance in EU 
law, for the reasons previously explained. Nonetheless, I will argue that this is not the 
only value that is reflected in the EU legal system: other values are increasingly taken 
into account, either in the enforcement of negative integration rules, or in the 
legislative activity of the EU. The more holistic approach the European Commission 
has recently embraced in the regulation of the Internal Market is a telling illustration 
of this trend. The aim of the EU is not to promote interstate trade but efficient 
interstate trade. The integration in the Treaty of the Charter of fundamental rights and 
the extension of the powers of the EU to act in a variety of non-strictly economic 
areas indicate that the time of the seclusion to the economic sphere is over.  
This evolution raises a number of questions as to the meaning of “economic 
integration”. This term cannot be defined simply as the process of eroding national 
regulatory barriers to trade; such a narrow definition would jeopardise the promotion 
of efficient interstate trade. It cannot also be restricted to that of curbing national 
protectionism. Protectionist measures are clearly inefficient, because they do not take 
into account foreign interests that might be affected by the measure. However, the 
characterization of protectionist measure emphasizes revealed national preferences 
and does not take into account a possible transformation of national preferences, 
which might be a consequence of the Internal Market project. That denies to the 
Internal Market its transformative effect: it is more a project of “market building” than 
one of “market maintenance”8. The integration of efficiency considerations in the 
analysis of restrictions of interstate trade challenges the current understanding of the 
“integration” concept. The study attempts to sketch a different theoretical framework 
for the concept of integration that would be compatible with the broader efficiency 
approach.  
I will first explore the meaning of economic integration, by opposing a process 
versus an outcome view of this concept. I will then argue that the outcome view of 
integration that initially prevailed was particularly narrow, as this is illustrated by the 
application of the negative integration rules of the Treaty on the free movement of 
goods (Art. 34 TFEU), with the result that efficient restrictions of trade were subject to 
                                                 
8
 Indeed, in contrast to the “market maintenance” logic, “market building” intervenes at the level of 
preference formation in an attempt to break up past path-dependencies and established national 
habits. Contrast Donald Regan, ‘The Supreme Court and State Protectionism : Making Sense of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause’, (1986) 84 Michigan L Rev 1091 with Miguel Poiares Maduro, We, The 
Court (Oxford: Hart Pub., 1998), at 98. 
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strict scrutiny. The evolution of the jurisprudence of the Court in the interpretation of 
Article 34 TFEU as well as the more inclusive to other non-trade values perspective 
recently embraced by the Commission in the positive integration program indicate, 
however, a turn towards a more holistic approach that accommodates efficient 
restrictions of trade. I will conclude that this evolution raises important challenges to 
the traditional concept of “economic integration” and suggests the need for a different 
conceptual framework. 
 
I. The meaning of “economic” integration: Process versus outcome views 
 
In introducing the Florence Project on “Integration through law”, Mauro 
Cappelletti, Monica Seccombe and Joseph H.H. Weiler observed that its scope was 
“to examine the role of law in the process of European integration, as seen against 
the American federal experience”9. They noted that “integration is fundamentally a 
political process”, which “is largely determined by political actors and political will”10. 
The authors underlined the main “existential dilemma” facing the process of 
European integration, “inherent in most forms of social organizations”: 
 “the dilemma of reaching an equilibrium between, on the one hand, a  respect for 
the autonomy of the individual unit, freedom of choice, pluralism and diversity of 
action, and, on the other hand, the societal need for cooperation, integration, 
harmony and, at times, unity”11. 
They also observed that 
“(t)he desire for this equilibrium is the product not only of a quest for a functional 
optimization of economic and social welfare, but also of the more profound and 
never-ending search for a peaceful order which is at the same time consonant 
with the ideals of liberty and justice”12.  
The comparative perspective followed and the emphasis given on the principles of 
federalism brought to the authors’ attention the tensions between the centre and the 
periphery, between the federal/Community level and the State level, which was a 
                                                 
9
 Mauro Cappelletti, Monica Seccombe & Joseph H.H. Weiler, ‘Integration Through Law: Europe and 
the American Federal Experience A general Introduction’, in Mauro Cappelletti, Monic Seccombe & 
Joseph Weiler (ed.) Integration Through Law, Vol. 1, Methods, Tools and Institutions, Book 1, A 
Political, Legal and Economic Overview (de Guyter, 1986), at 3. 
10
 Ibid., at 4. 
11
 Ibid., Emphasis added. 
12
 Ibid. Emphasis added. 
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common feature of the US federal system and that of the EC at the time. The authors 
took care not to identify integration with a strengthening of the centre at the expense 
of the periphery or with the tightening hold of the centre on the periphery. They 
viewed, instead, integration and federalism as “twin concepts”. Both express “the 
societal philosophy and organizational principle which require a particular balancing 
of individual and communal interest- a balance between particular and general, 
peripheral and central, and between autonomy and heteronomy”13. The emphasis put 
on the method, the balancing of different interests, indicates that the equilibrium they 
had in mind was evolutionary. The process of balancing guarantees that at any point 
of time the equilibrium would be optimal and should be accepted as such, without 
any reference to an ideal or optimal state, other than one ensuring the viability of the 
entire frame. Making sure that the “union” functions “smoothly” is the only constraint 
imposed.  
This “process” view is also reflected on the measure of the “success” of the legal 
integration advanced by the authors. For the operation of “legal integration”, it is 
necessary to develop a “new federal system”, itself based on a “new legal order”14. 
The success of the legal integration relates to the success of the new legal system. 
But how can one measure the success of a legal system? One of the possible 
measures of success is the acceptance by those subject to it, which in the case of 
federalism includes the constituent states and the “people”. They noted that  
“(a)cceptance of the law could be an indication of the acceptance of the 
integration process. Instruments for enforcing compliance are of course essential; 
but unless compliance is largely voluntary and the use of force only exceptional, 
the system is likely to crack under the strain. Again very simplistically, compliance 
is obtained by securing the subjects’ confidence in the system, principally – or so 
at least we believe in Western democracies – by allowing the subjects to 
participate both in the selection of the form of government and in the law-making 
process and by assuring through procedural means that substantially the laws 
reflect or satisfy the common values of the society. As for the concept of 
‘efficiency’, in addition to normal connotations applicable to any system of 
governance, in a non-unitary system we may specifically ask whether the 
functions of government are indeed allocated as between the central authority 
                                                 
13
 Ibid., at 14. 
14
 Ibid., at 25. 
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and the constituent units in the most efficient way. The test of efficiency is of 
course much more difficult to construct and is almost always value laden. For 
some it will be an economic notion of maximizing the utility of resources, for yet 
others it could represent a system which most successfully responded to the 
wishes of its constituents. The authors in this project have adopted different 
definitions of these concepts”.15 
What emerges from this excerpt is the emphasis put on the process, rather than 
on the end-result. The participation of the constituent parts to the law-making and the 
existence of procedural means to guarantee that the law reflects or satisfies the 
common values of the society is emphasized. When the discussion comes, however, 
to efficiency, the authors are adepts of value pluralism and argue that there is not 
one value that should shape its content. 
The same volume included a chapter introducing the economic perspective on 
European integration. Jacques Pelkmans offered the standard definition of “economic 
integration” as “the elimination of economic frontiers between two or more 
economies”16. Here, the focus was different: outcomes matter. Pelkmans explained: 
“(t)he fundamental significance of economic integration is that differences in 
prices of equivalent goods, services and factors of production be decreased to the 
irreducible minima arising from spatial differentiation. With the equalization of 
product and factor prices over the integrated ‘economic area’, no further resource 
savings can be made in respect of a given production which implies that the 
highest possible efficiency has been achieved. Of course, there is nothing 
inherently good in removing literally every economic frontier, as there will be, at 
any given point in time, social and non-material reasons for imperfections in 
mobilities. Economic integration might even collide with cultural or religious 
values. However, assuming a minimum homogeneity of such values, or at least 
absence of fundamental value conflicts, a case can be made that, under certain 
conditions, economic integration improves the ‘welfare’ of the integrating 
economies”17. 
                                                 
15
 Ibid.. 
16
 Jacques Pelkmans, ‘The Institutional Economics of European Integration, in Integration Through 
Law: Europe and the American Federal Experience A General Introduction’, in Mauro Cappelletti, 
Monic Seccombe & Joseph Weiler (ed.) Integration Through Law, Vol. 1, Methods, Tools and 
Institutions, Book 1, A Political, Legal and Economic Overview (de Guyter, 1986), at 318. 
17
 Ibid., at 319. Emphasis added. 
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The “welfare” gains brought by “economic integration” refer essentially to 
allocative and productive efficiency. There has been some effort to quantify these 
gains, although, as Dennis Swann has noted, the Cockfield White Paper published 
by the European Commission in 198518 did not estimate the benefits of completing 
the Internal Mand “instead, the Commission acted first and carried out the 
calculations later”19. The Cecchini Report proceeded to a more detailed evaluation of 
the benefits of the removal of trade barriers, barriers to production and the greater 
enjoyment of economies of scale and the reduction of costs20. The “welfare gains” 
referred to allocative and productive efficiency, as well as to the creation of millions of 
jobs. No detailed analysis was, however, provided on the possible benefits and costs 
of “economic integration” on other parameters of welfare (social protection, 
environment, quality of life indicators, equality). These were notoriously ignored. 
The analysis of the concepts of “legal integration” and “economic integration” 
indicates an inherent tension between a “process” and an “outcome” view of the 
concept of integration. The implications of the process view are clear with regard to 
the participation of the Member States to the decision-making process: the 
constituent parts influence the norms adopted by the centre (positive integration). 
The process view would also require a continuous balancing of the competing 
interests of the centre and the periphery in the application of negative integration 
rules. The objective of balancing is not to uncover an efficient static equilibrium. The 
process view does not espouse a deterministic model, but one that relies on a 
stochastic process evolving over time, ignited by the random political shocks that 
might alter the preferences and values of the actors and thus the probable systemic 
outcomes. In contrast, the outcome view leaves no room for random variation of the 
preferences and the values of the actors, which are considered as a given.  
An additional difference between the process and the outcome view is that they 
commend the involvement of different institutional actors, at least as a matter of 
                                                 
18
 Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the European Council (Milan, 
28-29 June 1985), COM(85) 310, June 1985, available at 
http://europa.eu/documents/comm/white_papers/pdf/com1985_0310_f_en.pdf. 
19
 Dennis Swann, The Economics of the Common market, integration in the European Union (Penguin, 
8
th
 ed., 1995), at 134. 
20
 Europe 1992 – The Overall Challenge (Cechini Report), 1988, at 17 (summary available at SEC (88) 
524 final) identified a number of “cost-savings” from market integration: “the static trade effect” 
(possibility of buying from cheaper foreign suppliers), “the competition effect” (downward pressure on 
prices and improvement of productive efficiency as a result of the introduction of international 
competition), “the restructuring effect” (economies of scale and greater efficiency). 
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degree. The process view essentially requires constant political bargaining to 
uncover the evolving preferences and values of the actors. Consequently, it involves 
political personnel. The outcome view relies on the involvement of a different kind of 
personnel. As the systemic objective pursued is a given, there is more emphasis on 
coherence, effectiveness and delivery. “Experts” will run the show. A greater 
involvement of institutions composed by experts, as opposed to mainly political 
institutions, is an indicator of the prevalence of the outcome view of integration.  
The political circumstances of the first decades of European integration inevitably 
led to the strengthening of institutions composed by experts, the Commission and the 
judiciary, as opposed to political institutions, such as the Council and the European 
Parliament. Faced with a blockage of the route of positive integration, through 
political consensus between the constituent States, after the Luxembourg 
compromise in 1966, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) stepped in with the aim to 
promote the interest of the centre in the process of negative integration and to 
facilitate the task of the European Commission in its legislative initiatives to 
harmonize the Internal Market (the so called “heroic period”)21. Following the Court’s 
intervention, the process of integration became “judicially constituted” – or at least 
judicially centred - and remained so, at least until the enactment of the Single 
European Act and the new approach of harmonization, also largely dominated by the 
European Commission, another body whose legitimacy lies on expertise22.  
 The intervention of expert institutions, as opposed to political institutions, 
illustrates the prevalence of the outcome versus the process view of integration. But it 
had also implications on the kind of outcome view that has finally prevailed.  
A distinction may be established between the “narrow outcome view” and the 
“broad outcome view”, as each of them represents a different understanding of the 
concept of efficiency. 
The narrow outcome view perceives that the overall aim of the integration is the 
promotion/facilitation of trade between Member States. Its immediate targets are 
barriers to trade, defined as impediments to intra-EU trade exchange. Efficiency is 
not the only reason to promote trade. It is also possible to advance non-economic 
considerations for facilitating trade between Member States, such as the idea that 
                                                 
21
 J. H. H. Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ (1991) 100 The Yale L J 2403, 2428. 
22
 J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The Constitution of the Common Market Place: Text and Context in the Evolution of 
the Free Movement of Goods’, in Paul Craig & Gráinne de Búrca (ed.) The Evolution of EU Law (OUP, 
1999), pp. 349-375, at 350. 
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economic interdependency increases the likelihood of political integration or that it is 
an indispensable step in the “market building” project23. Poiares Maduro explains: 
“(m)arket agents in Europe are, by contrast to the American market, used to 
operating in a context of national markets. Their path-dependence has been 
linked to those: they know their way across national rules and national political 
processes; they have planned their strategies according to national markets […] 
national political processes operate according to national accountability; and 
actors have constructed their networks around these national political and 
economic markets”24. 
Breaking the path-dependence on national economic and political processes 
becomes the aim of economic integration. The economic actors’ preferences are not 
exogenously determined, but endogenously transformed by the operation of the 
integration principle. This can be achieved either by uniform regulatory standards that 
would shatter existing national political processes or by the deregulation of public and 
private barriers to intra-community trade that partition these national markets and 
thus create obstacles to the “Single market”. Consequently, an approach that would 
only bring within the scope of an EU law prohibition measures that are discriminatory 
or protectionists would frustrate the “desire to attain a fully unified market”25. 
On the contrary, the broad outcome view of economic integration does not focus 
only on interstate trade facilitation, but includes other aspects of welfare, considered 
important not only by the Member States, but also by their citizens26. These include 
environmental and social protection, cultural diversity, equality, to cite but a few. 
Their maximization might conflict with the objective of trade facilitation.  
The next section will examine the definition of a measure equivalent to a 
quantitative restriction (MEQR), prohibited by Article 34 TFEU, which is at the heart 
of the debate over the “narrow” and the “broad” outcome view of economic 
integration.  
 
                                                 
23
 Miguel Poiares Maduro, We, The Court (Hart Pub., 1998), 88-102; Stephen Weatherill, ‘Pre-emption 
, Harmonization and the Distribution of Competence’, in Catherine Barnard & Joanne Scott (eds.), The 
Law of the Single European Market: Unpacking the Premises (Hart Pub. 2002), pp. 41-73, at 49. 
24
 Ibid., at 98. 
25
 Catherine Barnard, ‘Restricting Restrictions: Lessons for the EU from the US?’, (2009) 68(3) 
Cambridge L J pp. 575-606, at 583. 
26
 The latter became more directly involved in the process of integration, through the increasing role of 
the European Parliament and the constitution of the EU citizenship 
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II. The rise and fall of the “obstacles to (intra-Community) trade approach” in 
the definition of MEQR under Article 34 TFEU 
 
The definition of MEQR under Article 34 TFEU is of great importance for 
determining the scope of the negative integration provisions of the Treaty. In  
Dassonville27, the Court had to decide between two different approaches. One view 
supported the prohibition of only regulations that imposed discriminatory or 
protectionist obstacles to trade. Another view argued for the extension of the concept 
of MEQR to catch any restriction of inter-state trade, even if it was indistinctly 
applicable and had the same impact for both imported and domestic goods and even 
if it’s main purpose was to promote efficient trade (obstacles to trade approach). The 
Court finally adopted the “obstacles to trade” approach28. 
The choice of this broad definition29, confirmed and extended by subsequent case 
law30, was later transposed to the interpretation of other freedoms of movement, 
notably in the area of services31 and establishment32. It did not extend, however, to 
pecuniary restrictions of trade imposed by internal taxation that are found within the 
scope of the Treaty, only if the trader proves that they are discriminatory or 
protectionists33. J.H.H. Weiler noted the apparent incoherence of the approach of the 
Court: 
                                                 
27
 Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville [1974] ECR 837 (hereinfter 
Dassonville). 
28
 Ibid., at para 5, holding that “all trading rules enacted by member States which are capable of 
hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade are to be considered as 
measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions” 
29
 However, this definition of MEQR is not as broad as to cover restrictions of trade in a wholy internal 
situation, which remain outside the scope of Article 34 TFEU. See, Case C-212/06, Government of the 
French Community and Walloon Government v. Flemish Government [2008] ECR I-1683, para 38. For 
an analysis see, Alina Tryfonidou, ‘The Outer Limits of Article 28 EC : Purely Internal Situations and 
the Development of the Court’s Approach Through the Years’, in Catherine Barnard & Okeoghene 
Odudu (eds.), The Outer Limits of EU Law (Hart Pub., 2009), pp. 197-243. 
30
 See, Case 268/8, Oosthoek’s [1982] ECR 4575 (extending the obstacles approach to indistinctly 
applicable measures that affect just the marketing opportunities of foreign products) ; Joined Cases 
60-61/84, Cinéthèque [1985] ECR 2605, para 22 (declaring that Article 34 TFEU covers non-
discriminatory national measures that create barriers to intra-Community trade). 
31
 Case C-76/90, Manfred Säger v Dennemeyer & Co. Ltd [1991] I-4221, para 12, “(a)rticle [56 TFEU] 
requires not only the elimination of all discrimination against a person providing services on the ground 
of his nationality but also the abolition of any restriction, even if it applies without distinction to national 
providers of services and to those of other Member States, when it is liable to prohibit or otherwise 
impede the activities of a provider of services established in another Member State where he lawfully 
provides similar services”. 
32
 On Article 49 TFEU see, Case C-55/94, Reinhard Gebhard v Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e 
Procuratori di Milano [1995] ECR I-4165, para 37. 
33
 See, Catherine Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU (Oxford: OUP, 2
nd
 ed., 2007), 45-63.  
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“(d)oes it make sense to apply the principle of non-discrimination and thereby give 
the state near total freedom to regulate through tax […] but to apply the principle 
of obstacles to any non-pecuniary regulation (even if non-discriminatory) and 
require the state to justify its regulatory choice […] by reference to some 
authorized list of exceptions each and every time its non-pecuniary regulation 
hinders the marketing of imported products?”34. 
One might also add the incoherence of applying a broad “obstacle to trade” approach 
for tax rules that affect, for example, freedom of establishment35, while internal 
taxation is subject to a more restrictive test under Article 110 TFEU. Furthermore, the 
Court did not extend the “obstacle to trade” approach to restrictions on exports, which 
fall under Article 35 TFEU only if they are discriminatory against goods involved in 
cross-border trade36.  
The implementation of the “obstacles to trade approach”, for non-pecuniary 
regulations, had important implications on the role of the Court and the dominant 
perspective of European integration. According to J.H.H. Weiler, 
“(i)nstitutionally, the Dassonville thrust the Court to the centre of substantive 
policy dilemmas. The Court, as a Community Institution had to become the arbiter 
of delicate social choices, reconciling trade with competing social policies. 
Constitutionally, as mentioned, Dassonville represented a massive expansion in 
the legislative competence of the Community”37. 
Any public barrier imposing a restriction of trade could fall under the prohibition 
principle. The new architecture included, nonetheless, a compromise making 
acceptable that change to the tenants of the process view. The autonomy of Member 
States in adopting measures that would restrict intra-community trade was limited, 
although they still had the choice to justify these measures for public interest 
objectives, under specific circumstances. The explicit exception to the prohibition 
principle, provided for in Article 36 TFEU, authorized Member States to maintain 
measures that were restrictive of trade by introducing a two-steps approach, where in 
                                                 
34
 J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The Constitution of the Common Market Place: Text and Context in the Evolution of 
the Free Movement of Goods’, in Paul Craig & Gráinne de Búrca (ed.) The Evolution of EU Law (OUP, 
1999), at 358. 
35
 See, Case C-168/01 Bosal Holding BV v. Staatssecretaris van Financiën [2003] ECR I-9409. 
36
 Case C-205/07. Criminal proceedings. Against  Lodewijk Gysbrechts. and. Santurel Inter BVBA 
[2008] ECR I-9947. 
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the first step, the claimant proved the existence of a restriction of trade and, in the 
second step, the Member State provided justifications that the restriction of trade is 
efficient and thus did not fall under the scope of the Treaty prohibition.  
The margin of discretion left to Member States is thus limited.  
First, the “obstacles view” leads to an asymmetrical allocation of the evidential 
burden of proof between the Member States and the traders. The traders can easily 
argue that a specific state legislation could potentially restrict intra-community trade 
and is thus an obstacle to trade. The evidential burden of proof would then shift to the 
Member States in order to argue justifications, the standard of proof imposed on the 
Member States being particularly high.  
Second, the list of objective justifications enumerated in Article 36 TFEU is limited 
to what constituted the thrust of state intervention in markets, the time the Treaty was 
drafted, and does not include new emerging terrains of state regulation: in particular, 
environmental, social and consumer protection. The Member States had not agreed 
to a more flexible scope for explicit objective justifications, as it was unclear at the 
time of the drafting of the Treaty, that the prohibition of Article 34 TFEU covered also 
non-discriminatory restrictions of trade. The risk of a political back-clash led the Court 
to enlarge the scope of objective justifications by a judicially-created exception, the 
mandatory requirements of general interest of Cassis de Dijon38. These did not, 
however, apply to state regulation that formally distinguished between domestic and 
foreign products (discrimination in law), which fell under Article 34 TFEU and could 
only be justified by the explicit Treaty-based justification of Article 36 TFEU.  
Third, the Court maintains an allocation of the evidential burden of proof that is 
less favourable to Member States, by reinforcing the “obstacles approach” with a 
presumption of functional parallelism/equivalence of the regulation of the home 
country with that of the host country: “(t)here is […] no valid reason why, provided 
that they have been lawfully produced and marketed in one of the member States, 
(products) should not be introduced into any other Member State”. The Member 
States can rebut the presumption by claiming mandatory requirements of general 
interest. In comparison, traders needed only to contend that the host state’s 
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regulation imposed an additional requirement, in comparison to the home state’s 
regulation, in order to successfully bear the required standard of proof of a MEQR 
and thus shift the burden of proof to the Member States for objective justifications.  
The application of the principle of functional parallelism/equivalence leads to a 
limited extraterritorial application of the home State rule. The host State is under the 
obligation to accept the standards, checks and control of the home State, unless it 
shows that these standards or measures do not conform to its own standards of 
protection of the specific public interest objective. If this is the case, the host State’s 
regulation would apply, subject to the proportionality test. The latter operates in order 
to unveil opportunistic behaviour in the use of the equivalence principle. The 
conjunction of the market access principle with the principle of equivalence provides 
economic operators with a limited right to choose among different national regulatory 
regimes. However, it does not establish a regime of regulatory competition, as the 
host State is not obliged to accept the standards set by the home State, if these do 
not preserve the social and moral values that are protected by its regulation. 
Fourth, the justification of the measure by the Member State is subject to a 
strict proportionality test. Proportionality is also a general principle of EU law, 
applying as such to all measures adopted by the EU institutions39. The test does not 
involve any effort of quantifying the costs imposed by the restrictions to trade and 
comparing them to the benefits of the public interest objectives advanced by the 
Member State. The test might resort to intuitive analysis but it does not require the 
identification of a specific result of the trade-off, as would a proper cost-benefit 
analysis test. In most cases, where the Court applied the proportionality test, it 
divided the analysis in three steps: (1) is the measure suitable to achieve the desired 
end? (finality test); (2) was it necessary to achieve this end? (necessity test); (3) did 
the measure impose a burden which was excessive? (excessive dis-proportionality 
test) or could the State have adopted alternative means that were less restrictive of 
trade? (least restrictive alternative test or LRA test).  
The third step of the analysis might introduce a need for quantification, if taken 
literally. The examination of the least restrictive alternative theoretically requires the 
identification of the costs for inter-state trade of the specific state regulation and 
comparison with the costs of an alternative state regulation (the counterfactual) that 
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is likely to achieve similar aims. Nevertheless, a comparative quantitative analysis of 
the specific state regulation and the counterfactual has never occurred in the 
jurisprudence of the Court. The public interest benefits brought by the state 
regulation and the counterfactual may be specified only in very few circumstances. 
For example, it might be possible to find the disparate impact on trade of different 
levels of environmental protection but it would be more difficult to perform for less 
precise public interest objectives, such as consumer protection, protection of social 
rights, cultural diversity, public health etc, where the identification of acceptable levels 
of risks is extremely complex and depends on local conditions (social, political, 
economic) and social norms. The analysis could only be a qualitative one in these 
circumstances.  
The Court delegated the task of assessing the proportionality of the state 
regulation to national courts that are most likely to dispose of the required information 
on the local conditions and acceptable levels of risk (local preferences). The Court 
did not, however, proceed to a blank delegation but attempted to provide more 
detailed guidance on the LRA test. For example, the Court considered that a labelling 
requirement was an adequate less restrictive to trade alternative. This had important 
consequences on the level of acceptable risk. The level of risk to which consumers 
are subject because of the labelling requirement depends, of course, on a number of 
external factors and social norms, such as the level of overall consumer protection 
and thus consumers’ incentive to be vigilant and read systematically the labels of the 
products, which might differ according to the circumstances in each Member State.  
 The relatively low standard of proof for the existence of a restriction of trade, 
because of the obstacles approach and the presumption of functional parallelism, as 
well as the difficulty to argue successfully public interest objectives, had profound 
implications on the reconciliation of the trade facilitation objective with other 
objectives of public action that would be favoured by the application of the “broad 
outcome view” of integration. The position of the Court led to “an inbuilt conservative 
bias, or at least presumption, in favour of free trade, creating an ethos that any 
obstacle to free trade is, in some ways, improper and has to be justified”40. The 
Sunday trading cases are often cited as an illustration of the excesses of the 
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jurisprudence of the Court41. The ‘pathological end-game42” to the “obstacles 
approach” became apparent and the Court took steps to redress the unbalance. 
 First, there was the attempt to narrow down the broad “obstacles approach” 
by introducing a causation test between the measure and the restriction of trade. 
Measures that were too uncertain and indirect to establish a restriction of inter-state 
trade were found to escape the prohibition of Article 34 TFEU (the “remoteness” test), 
even if they could have potential effects on trade43. The test was closer to proximate 
causation than to a but-for causality test, as the simple fact that the measure could 
have contributed to a barrier to trade would not be a sufficient trigger to the 
application of Article 34 TFEU.  
Second, there has been an attempt to introduce some form of quantitative 
assessment in defining the existence of a restriction of inter-state trade. Advocate 
General Van Gerven in Torfaen44 and Advocate General Jacobs in Leclerc-Siplec45 
argued for the quantitative test of a de minimis restriction excluding from the scope of 
the Treaty state regulations that would have a minimal effect on inter-state trade. 
However, the application of a de minimis test for Article 34 TFEU was rejected in van 
de Haar46, although the terminology “insignificant effects” appears in some more 
recent cases47.  
 The third option available to the Court was to re-allocate the evidential burden 
of proof between the traders and the Member State, by establishing a new 
classification of measures that escapes prima facie the prohibition of Article 34 
TFEU. Some authors suggested a rationalization along the lines of rules on product 
requirements that would be presumed to fall under Article 34 TFEU and rules on 
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market circumstances that would be considered outside the scope of the prohibition, 
provided imported goods enjoyed equal access to the market compared to national 
goods48. The classification was based on some experience on the restrictive effect of 
this type of measures in the previous case law of the Court and on the assumption 
that rules on product requirements were imposing more important costs on imported 
goods than marketing arrangements rules. The instrumental objective of the 
classification was not, however, spelled out clearly. What lacked from the proposal 
was a clear linkage between the category of measures falling outside the scope of 
Article 34 TFEU and the aim pursued by this provision.  
 The European Court of Justice adopted a modified version of the classification 
in Keck and Mithouard, where it distinguished between product requirements and 
selling arrangements49. The Court re-allocated more favourably to Member States 
the evidential burden of proof for measures qualified of “selling arrangements”. 
Consequently, the presumption of functional parallelism does not operate for selling 
arrangements. The plaintiffs bear the burden of proof, even in presence of regulatory 
disparities between the home and the host state. The Court also abandoned the 
“obstacles approach” in the definition of a MEQR by requiring the plaintiffs to provide 
evidence that the rules on selling arrangements in question have a discriminatory 
impact (in law or in fact) on the imported goods. The Court explained that the 
prohibition of “discrimination in fact” precluded any measure that would be “by nature 
such as to prevent [the imported goods’] access to the market or to impede access 
any more than it impedes the access of domestic products”50. The classification 
between selling arrangements and product requirements was further refined by the 
distinction between pure selling arrangements and marketing methods employed by 
the trader that affect the nature, composition or packaging of the good, which are 
treated as product requirement rules51.  
At the aftermaths of the Keck and Mithouard judgement, the jurisprudence of 
the Court had restricted the scope of application of the “obstacles to trade approach” 
and had embraced explicitly a methodology that required evidence of the disparate 
impact of the state regulation on foreign products for the application of Article 34 
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TFEU. This was not achieved without some degree of legal formalism. The Court 
introduced the classification of “product requirements” and “selling arrangements” 
with a view to provide a greater degree of administrability of the enforcement of 
Article 34 TFEU to national courts. However, the theoretical underpinnings of the 
dichotomy and its relation to the decision criterion, evidence of an obstacle to trade or 
discrimination, were left undetermined. The recent jurisprudence of the ECJ on 
restrictions on the use of products became an opportunity to reconsider the fragile 
equilibrium of Keck and Mithouard and to provide a unified framework for the 
interpretation of Article 34 TFEU. 
 
III. The need for a unified framework for the interpretation of Article 34 TFEU: 
vagaries of the “market access” concept 
 
 In its most recent jurisprudence, the ECJ “fine-tuned” its approach in Keck by 
referring to the concept of “market access”, alongside the product requirement/selling 
arrangement dichotomy52. The concept has attracted considerable criticism. It has 
been referred to as a slogan rather than a “workable legal concept”53. What is 
profoundly unclear, argues Jukka Snell, is how this concept contributes to the 
illumination of the “fundamental question for free movement law”, that is “whether the 
law is about discrimination and anti-protectionism, in which case a relative or 
comparative test is based on a perceptible disparate impact is appropriate, or 
whether it is about economic freedom, in which case an absolute test not involving 
comparisons is necessary”54. The relation of the “market access” concept with the 
product requirement/selling arrangement dichotomy remains also a matter of 
theoretical speculation. Does the reference to market access aim to substitute the 
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Keck distinction?  Or, is it complementary to the categorical approach followed in 
Keck?  
These are valid questions, but it is also important to recognize that the 
terminology of “market access” used by the Court is not fortuitous. The “obstacles to 
trade” approach focused on the existence of a potential (and abstract) impact on 
intra-community trade, without feeling the need to examine how the specific 
regulation affected the cost structures of the products and the decision of the 
entrepreneurs to enter a foreign market. The “market access” test re-focuses the 
analysis of the impact of the measure on specific products and entrepreneurial 
strategies. It makes also necessary the recourse to a certain degree of counterfactual 
analysis. Finally, as it will be argued in this section, it emphasizes the impact of the 
State measure on the competitive relationship between the foreign and the domestic 
product, which becomes the main focus of the first part of an Article 34 TFEU inquiry. 
 
A. Criticism of the selling arrangement/product requirement dichotomy and 
the quest for a unified conceptual framework 
 
 The selling arrangements/product requirements dichotomy was subject to 
severe criticism, also within the ECJ.  
In Alfa Vita, AG Poiares Maduro discussed the “practical difficulties” created by 
the Keck and Mithouard jurisprudence55. He argued that the classification of the 
measure as a selling arrangement or a product requirement was not clear enough to 
national courts and that it was not easily transposed into the fields of other freedoms 
of movement. The “pragmatic” approach developed by the Court could lead to 
inconsistencies: 
“(i)n some cases, it is difficult to distinguish selling arrangements from national 
rules relating to the characteristics of products, for the very reason that the 
existence of a restriction on trade is dependent on the method of application of 
a rule and its concrete effects. In other cases, it is impossible to include a 
measure within one or other of these categories because the variety of rules 
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which may be called into question does not fit easily into such a restricted 
framework”56. 
 These difficulties were not, however, a cause to abandon this case-law, but an 
opportunity to clarify it. The AG provided a consequentialist reading of the principle of 
free movement of goods, linking its protection to beneficial outcomes for producers, 
but also consumers: the fundamental objective of the principle of free movement of 
goods is “to ensure that producers are put in a position to benefit, in fact, from the 
right to carry out their activity at a cross-border level, while consumers are put in a 
position to access, in practice, products from other member State in the same 
conditions as domestic products”57. This is compatible with the “narrow outcome 
view” of trade facilitation, with the main difference that the focus is also now on the 
demand-side (consumers), and not only on the supply-side (foreign suppliers). He 
further observed that the freedoms of movement “represent the cross-border 
dimension of the economic and social status conferred on European citizens”58, and 
that such status “requires going beyond guaranteeing that there will be no 
discrimination based on nationality” and requires also from the Member States to 
take into account “the effect of the measures they adopt on the position of all 
European Union citizens wishing to assert their rights to freedom of movement”59.  
From these principles AG Poiares Maduro derived three “concrete criteria”. 
First, any direct or indirect discrimination based on nationality is prohibited as a 
MEQR. Second, measures that impose “supplementary costs on goods in circulation 
in the Community or on traders carrying out a cross-border activity60” create a barrier 
to trade, which needs to be duly justified. The AG noted that “not every imposition of 
supplementary costs is wrongful” and that “costs that arise from disparities in the 
laws of the Member States cannot be considered to be restrictions on freedom of 
movement”61. The factor distinguishing between legitimate and wrongful 
supplementary costs was the following: 
 “to be considered as a restriction on trade, the supplementary cost imposed 
must stem from the fact that the national rules did not take into account the 
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particular situation of the imported products and, in particular, the fact that 
those products already had to comply with the rules of their States of origin”62. 
This criterion clearly applies to rules relating to the characteristics of products 
and thus justifies the shift of the evidential burden of proof to the Member State, in 
case there is a cost imposed to the foreign product. It is less clear how it will apply for 
rules on selling arrangements, for which the evidential burden of proof is bore by the 
traders. For selling arrangements, the AG introduces the third criterion, which 
examines if the measure impedes to a greater extent the access to the market of 
products from other Member States63. From these three concrete criteria, the AG 
concluded that a “consistent approach emerges” which amounts “in substance to 
identifying discrimination against the exercise of freedom of movement”64.  
This conceptualization of the jurisprudence of the Court offers the opportunity 
to re-consider the “formal answer” of the Court in Keck, by demonstrating that 
“presumptions based on the character of these rules are not sufficient65” and that the 
measures must be examined in the light of the stated criteria. It also invites a more 
holistic analysis of the Court’s approach on rules on product requirements and selling 
arrangements. AG Poiares Maduro continued to rely on the narrow outcome view of 
economic integration, but he adopted a broader criterion in the definition of a MEQR 
than the “obstacles of trade approach”. The analytical method recommended is 
confined to examine if the regulation creates objectively more disincentives for 
engaging in foreign trade than in domestic trade. It is thus compatible with the 
“market building” role of the free movement rules, by including measures whose 
effect is to reduce opportunities of intra-community trade more than opportunities of 
domestic trade. 
 In Commission v. Italian Republic, AG Léger suggested a different approach66. 
The Court was referred a preliminary question on the application of Article 34 TFEU 
to a national rule prohibiting mopeds from towing trailers. The object of the national 
regulation was to impose a restriction on the use of the product. AG Léger 
considered that such rule constituted a MEQR, as it was imposing “a general and 
absolute prohibition on the towing of trailers by mopeds” and thus impeded the free 
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movement of trailers67. The link between the measure and the effect was that “the 
coupling of a trailer to a vehicle of that kind constitutes a normal and frequently used 
means of transport, particularly in rural areas”68. No statistics or other factual 
references were cited for such finding. The AG concluded that “such prohibition is 
liable to limit opportunities for trade between the Italian Republic and the other 
member States and to hamper imports and the marketing” in Italy of trailers 
manufactured and marketed in other States. It is noteworthy that AG Léger ignored 
the Keck and Mithouard dichotomy and proceeded to a qualification of the measure 
as a MEQR, based on its impact on the trade for trailers. His approach is thus 
different from that of AG Poiares Maduro, who did not insist on the effects on the 
trade of trailers but on the discrimination between Community trade and trade within 
the national market and did not abandon the Keck dichotomy. 
 The same case led to a second Opinion by AG Bot, as the Court re-opened 
the oral proceedings and referred the case to the Grand Chamber69. AG Bot qualified 
the measures as MEQR but attempted to sketch a different conceptual framework for 
Article 34 TFEU from that suggested by AG Léger. For AG Bot, the Court’s case law 
in Dassonville brought within the scope of Article 34 TFEU “all forms of economic 
protectionism” practiced by the Member States. However, the Court has limited this 
“excessive recourse to Article 34 TFEU” in Keck in order to avoid an excessive 
encroachment on the regulatory powers of the Member States70. The AG explained 
that the product requirements/selling arrangements dichotomy is related to the impact 
each category of measures has on intra-Community trade. Rules on product 
requirements almost always impose additional costs to importers. Products must be 
exportable with their existing composition, name, form labelling and packaging to all 
Member States, provided that “they meet the requirements of the State of origin”71. 
But once these products get access to the market “they must be subject to the 
‘marketing rules’ in force in that State” and “they must be on an equal footing with 
domestic products”72. Consequently, “the distinction between different categories of 
measures is not appropriate” as “the demarcation line between those different 
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categories of measures may be uncertain73” and “gives rise to differences in the way 
that restrictions on the free movement of goods are viewed by comparison with the 
rules applicable to other freedoms of movement”74. Referring to both “the 
requirements inherent in the construction of a single European market” and the 
“emergence of citizenship”, AG Bot concluded that the common feature of the rules 
applicable to other freedoms of movement is based “on the single criterion” of 
“access to the market”75. 
Despite this criticism to the distinction between product requirements and 
selling arrangements, the AG did not suggest any significant departure from the Keck 
dichotomy. He noted that rules governing arrangements for the use of products 
should not be treated in analogy to selling arrangements and thus should not be 
excluded prima facie from the scope of Article 34 TFEU. The reason advanced is 
inspired by the “obstacles to trade” approach: measures governing the use of 
products can hinder the movement of the product within the common market and 
thus “create an obstacle to intra-Community trade”76. Excluding these measures from 
the scope of Article 34 TFEU would come to make it possible for member States “to 
legislate in areas which, on the contrary, the legislature wished to ‘communautarize’” 
and would oppose “the course that European construction and the creation of a 
single European market should follow”77. By equating “the obstacles to trade 
approach” to the existence of an EU competence to prevent Member States from 
affecting intra-community trade, the AG restricts considerably the autonomy of 
Member States to regulate their economy and to pursue other public interest 
objectives. The objective is to subject to the judicial review of the Community courts 
any measure that may have the effect to restrict trade.  
For the AG, the Court should apply the “criterion of access to the market”78, 
and find a MEQR contrary to the Treaty, where the national measure “prevented, 
impeded or rendered more difficult access to the market for products from other 
member States”79. This unified test could apply to all freedoms and would not involve 
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“any complex economic assessment”80. It will give rise to different presumptions: in 
situations of “overt discrimination” the obstacle to trade is clear and the measures 
should “be prohibited as such by Article 34 TFEU”81. The distinction selling 
arrangements/product requirements is thus perceived as aiming “to identify the 
conditions under which each of those categories may affect access to the market”82. 
The classification of the measure corresponds to a difference in the degree of 
probability that a certain type of measure will impede market access, “regardless of 
the aim pursued by the measure in question”83. In conclusion, AG Bot offered a 
unified conceptual framework for MEQR, based on the existence of an impediment to 
the market access of the imported good, but also advanced a differentiated rule with 
regard to the standard of proof for different categories of measures. 
 In Ăklagaren v. Percy Mickelsson, AG Kokott joined the debate with a different 
recommendation84. The issue in this case was a Swedish regulatory restriction over 
the use of personal watercrafts. AG Kokott found that such restrictions could 
“possibly deter people from purchasing” the goods in question, the same way a 
speed limit on a motorway would have deterred people from buying a particularly fast 
car because they could not use them as they wish85. However, she opted for treating 
these restrictions on use by analogy to the way selling arrangements, were treated 
under Keck and Mithouard and therefore excluded them from the scope of Article 34 
TFEU. The characteristics of restrictions on use were found comparable to those of 
selling arrangements “in terms of the nature and the intensity of their effects on trade 
in goods”86. Being equivalent to selling arrangements, restrictions on use could fall 
under Article 34 TFEU if they did not affect in the same manner, in law and in fact, 
the marketing of domestic products and those from other Member States. The 
absence of domestic production was, for the AG, irrelevant. She noted, however that 
the situation would have been different if national rules were protecting domestic 
production similar to products covered by the contested rule or in competition with 
those products87. This is an interesting statement indicating that for AG Kokott a 
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measure becomes suspect if it modifies the competitive relation between domestic 
and foreign products. 
By analogy to selling arrangements, arrangements for use are not excluded 
from the scope of Article 34 TFEU when they prevent access to the market for the 
product in question. Preventing access includes, according to AG Kokott, not only 
rules which may lead to complete exclusion but also rules leaving only a “marginal 
possibility for using a product”88. The criterion of significant impediment of market 
access also excludes from the scope of Article 34 TFEU measures that have 
prevented access only for a negligibly short period89.  
The different positions of AG Poiares Maduro, Léger, Bot and Kokott on the 
interpretation of Article 34 TFEU illustrate the conceptual difficulties of reconciling the 
traditional “obstacles to trade” approach with the Keck and Mithouard dichotomy of 
product requirements and selling arrangements. The issue examined by all AG is the 
need, or not, to restrict the first step of the analysis under Article 34 TFEU, the finding 
of a restriction of intra-community trade, before the burden of proof shifts to the 
Member States for justifications under either the doctrine of mandatory requirements 
or the Treaty exceptions of Article 36 TFEU.  
It is crucial to step back and examine critically the terminology employed by 
the AGs. The criterion of “market access”, employed by almost all of them takes 
different connotations. For AG Poiares Maduro, it refers to situations where the 
national measure has a protectionist effect or makes intra-Community trade more 
difficult than trade within the national market. It is thus narrower than a simple 
impediment to trade. For AG Bot, it is a similar concept than “obstacle to trade” in the 
pure tradition of the Dassonville/Cassis de Dijon case law. For AG Kokott, it should 
indicate restrictions of trade that are significant enough to affect the competitive 
position of foreign products.  
The different conceptions of the AG are linked to their position over the 
respective scope of the first and the second step of the analysis under Article 34 
TFEU. If, for AG Poiares Maduro and to a lesser degree AG Kokott, the scope of the 
concept of restrictions of trade that triggers the assessment under Article 34 TFEU 
should be restricted, for AG Bot and AG Léger it should remain broad enough to 
bring within judicial control any measure that has the effect to impede inter-state 
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trade, irrespective of the existence of any evidence of protectionist intent or 
discrimination. Their position relates to their conception of the role of the judiciary in 
assessing the justifications proffered by the Member States. If, for AG Bot, there is no 
reason to depart from the existing analytical assessment by the judiciary of all state 
measures, AG Poiares Maduro is concerned with the possible disruptive effect that 
the judicial control of all measures that have the potential to impede trade might have 
on the pursuit of other public interest objectives that correspond to consumers and 
citizens’ preferences (efficient restrictions of trade). I will examine the profound 
implications of his conception of the judicial control of justifications in the following 
section. Most immediately, I will challenge the interpretation of the “market access” 
criterion by the AGs and will offer an alternative conceptualization of the first step of 
the assessment under Article 34 TFEU, in line with the purpose of this provision. 
  
B. A re-conceptualization of the “market access” criterion 
 
The “obstacles to trade approach” emphasizes the additional regulatory 
burden imposed on the foreign good. A narrower view would focus on the differential 
effect of the measure on the market access of foreign products compared to national 
products. The differences between these two approaches will be clarified by looking 
to two definitions of the concept of barriers to entry in industrial organization theory. 
Each definition has important implications on the scope of the first step of the 
assessment under Article 34 TFEU90. 
Economist Joe Bain defends a broad definition of barriers to entry91. His 
assumption is that, in competitive conditions, entry will occur until price is equal to the 
average cost of production. The persistence of prices above this level indicates the 
existence of entry barriers. His analysis integrates a comparison between pre-entry 
profits of established firms (the incumbents) and the post-entry profits of entrants. 
Barriers to entry would exist each time the entrant cannot achieve the profit levels 
post-entry that the incumbent enjoyed prior to its arrival92.  
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Economist George Stigler defines, in contrast, an entry barrier as “a cost of 
producing (at some or every rate of output) which must be borne by firms seeking to 
enter an industry but is not borne by firms already in the industry”93. The primary 
conceptual difference between Stigler’s and Bain’s definition is that, for Bain, the 
entrant and incumbent are compared post-entry: a barrier exists if the two are not 
equally efficient after the costs of entering the industry are taken into account. In 
contrast, Stigler considers an entry barrier to exist only if the conditions of entry were 
less difficult for established firms than for new entrants. The opposition between the 
Bainian and the Stiglerian definition of barriers to entry has been challenged by new 
industrial economics94. I think, however, that it can still provide a useful framework in 
order to understand the evolution of the definition of MEQR and the purpose of 
Article 34 TFEU, as well as to illustrate the differences between the “disparate impact 
approach” and the “obstacles approach”. 
 If one considers that the aim of the prohibition of MEQR is to increase trade 
between Member States (the obstacles approach), the provision will strike down any 
state regulation that would have a negative effect on a credible opportunity of trade. 
For a credible opportunity of trade to arise, consumers should be able to have access 
to the good in question and importers/traders should have the incentive to bring it on 
the market. The rules on the free movement of goods underline the incentives of 
importers/traders to offer foreign products on the national market. This depends on 
the profitability of the import, which is a function of the competitive position of the 
product, in relation to other products already present in the national market, and of 
the eventual costs that might affect the foreign product’s competitive position. It is 
clear that a product which is subject to two different state regulations, those of its 
home and host country (country of import), may incur higher costs than a product 
which is subject only to its home state regulation.  
It is possible to think of two counterfactuals in order to conclude that a product 
is subject to additional costs. The first counterfactual relates to the costs the product 
would have incurred if it were not subject to the home state’s regulation. That would 
be, in most cases, the regulation of its home country. Should one embrace this 
approach, any regulation enforced by the importing state that would have increased 
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the costs of the imported products, in comparison to the counterfactual, would be 
found to impose an obstacle to inter-state trade. This is close to the methodology 
employed in the definition of Bainian barriers to entry, which requires a comparison of 
the pre-entry profits of the incumbents and the post-entry profits of entrants. In this 
case, we compare the post-market entry costs imposed by the home regulation on 
foreign products with the post-import costs resulting from the host regulation. If the 
latter exceed the former, an obstacle to trade will be found. Should this interpretation 
of Article 34 TFEU prevail, the practical result would be that the home state’s 
regulation will apply extraterritorially to the host state, unless the latter argues public 
interest justifications95. 
 The second counterfactual compares the costs incurred by the foreign 
products with those costs that a product would have incurred if it were a national 
product. The decision-maker would have to compare in this case the costs post-entry 
of the domestic good with the costs post-import of the imported good. It is only if the 
costs post-import of the latter will exceed the costs post-entry of the former that an 
obstacle to trade would be found. This is close to the methodology used for the 
Stiglerian definition of barriers to entry, according to which barriers to entry are found 
when the conditions of entry are less difficult for established firms (which would be 
domestic products in our case) than for new entrants (imported goods in our case).  
 The choice of the appropriate counterfactual depends on the aim followed by 
the specific economic integration project. If the overall objective is to enhance the 
economic freedom of suppliers or to facilitate intra-community trade, the Bainian 
definition would be more appropriate, as any state regulation that may reduce the 
potential of inter-state commerce would fall under the scope of the prohibition of 
MEQR. It follows that a regulation that imposes additional costs for the specific 
product to reach the consumers of the host country might limit the opportunities of 
intra-community trade, as higher costs would lead to higher prices and lower levels of 
output. If, nevertheless, the overall aim of economic integration is to enhance efficient 
trade, then only restrictions of inter-state trade that modify the competitive 
relationship between the imported goods and the domestic goods, in favour of the 
second, should be included in the first step of the analysis. The Stiglerian definition of 
barriers to trade would be more appropriate in this case.  
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The analysis will require from the decision-maker to examine if the domestic 
goods were also subject to the same additional costs. It is only if they have not been 
subject to those additional costs that the measure will be qualified to a MEQR. The 
application of the host state’s measure will change the competitive relationship 
between the imported product and the domestic product. Accordingly, it is possible 
for Member States to impose additional costs to both domestic and imported 
products when these do not modify their competitive relationship. Indistinctly 
applicable measures may affect the competitive relation between domestic and 
imported products only when they have a disparate impact, because of the different 
pre-existing (the state regulation) market situation/economic context.  
 In what follows, I will show that the interpretation of Article 34 TFEU by some 
recent case law of the ECJ is compatible with the Stiglerian approach to barriers to 
trade. From this demonstration I will conclude that the Court should clearly abandon 
the “obstacles to trade” narrative in free movement of goods and should embrace 
instead “a disparate impact on market access” or discriminatory market access 
approach in the definition of MEQR. 
 
III. The operation of the “disparate impact on market access” test 
(discriminatory market access) 
  
 The focus of the post-Keck case law of the Court on the disparate effect of the 
regulation on foreign products can be conceived as an important shift in the definition 
of a MEQR. This does not challenge the distinction between product requirements 
and selling arrangements. The re-allocation of the evidential burden of proof in a way 
which is less favourable to traders has always constituted the main function of the 
product requirement/selling arrangement dichotomy. This is compatible with the 
Stiglerian conception of barriers to trade. State rules on product requirements almost 
always impose on imported products costs that have not been incurred by the 
domestic products post-entry into the market. The reason is that the process of 
domestic production internalizes the constraints of the specific regulatory context, 
prior to any business decision made over the designation, form, size, weight, 
composition, presentation, labelling or packaging of the product. Imported products 
do not benefit from such internalization of the host state’s regulatory framework, as 
their natural market is presumably that of their country of origin. Requiring the 
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imported products to incur such costs would thus almost automatically alter their 
competitive relationship with the domestic products, at least post-entry. This is not 
systematically the case for rules on selling arrangements, as domestic producers 
may also face the same uncertainties than importers as to their method of promotion 
or commercialisation in the domestic market.  
The assessment of restrictions on advertising under Article 34 TFEU illustrates 
the new approach followed by the Court96. In De Agostini the Court found that a total 
advertising restriction, effectively preventing access to host state’s market, would fall 
within the scope of Article 34 TFEU as “it might not be excluded that an outright ban, 
applying in one Member State, of a type of promotion for a product which is lawfully 
sold there might have a greater impact on products from other Member States”97. In 
Gourmet International Products the Court explained the disparate impact of an 
indistinctly applicable restriction on advertising for imported and domestic products: 
“[…] in the case of products like alcoholic beverages, the consumption of 
which is linked to traditional social practices and to local habits and customs, a 
prohibition of all advertising directed at consumers in the form of 
advertisements in the press, on the radio and on television, the direct mailing 
of unsolicited material or the placing of posters on the public highway is liable 
to impede access to the market by products, with which consumers are 
instantly more familiar”98. 
The assumption is that conditions of access to the consumer market are less 
difficult for domestic products than for imported products. Imported products are less 
likely to be known to consumers than domestic products and also less likely to make 
extensive use of advertising to the consumers of the host country in order to compete 
in equal terms with domestic products. Restrictions on specific forms of advertising 
may have the effect to impose on the foreign product costs that would not be incurred 
by the domestic products. The importers would need to have recourse to less 
appropriate forms of advertising or, in case there is a total ban on advertising, to 
more costly methods for the promotion and successful commercialisation of their 
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products. This is not, however, sufficient for the application of Article 34 TFEU99. The 
measure should also modify the competitive relation between the foreign and the 
domestic products100. 
The differential internalization of regulatory costs of rules on product 
requirements, compared to rules on selling arrangements, is a matter of degree, 
rather than a difference in kind. It is empirically true under specific circumstances, for 
example when there are established consumption trends for the domestic product. It 
is not always of general application101. However, categorical thinking is an abstract 
process that inevitably leads to situations of over-inclusiveness or under-
inclusiveness. There are important advantages in developing analytical shortcuts and 
other decision procedures that limit decision costs. 
 The Court has also stressed the analysis of the competitive relation between 
the imported and the domestic product in its free movement of services case law. In 
Mobistar, the Court found that a municipal tax on transmission pylons, masts and 
antennae for GSM that applied without distinction to all owners of mobile telephone 
installations within a commune did not adversely affect, either in fact or in law, foreign 
operators more than national operators102. The Court concluded that the tax 
measures in question did not make cross-border service provision more difficult than 
national service provision103. Notwithstanding the Court’s rejection of the product 
requirement/selling arrangements in its free movement of services case law104, the 
comparative analysis of the effect of the measure on the competitive relation between 
the imported and the domestic product forms part of the judicial assessment of the 
measure. The Court moved also in this case to a “discriminatory market access test 
by noting that 
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“[…] measures, the only effect of which is to create additional costs in respect 
of the service in question and which affect in the same way the provision of 
services between member States and that within one Member State, do not 
fall within the scope of Article [49] of the Treaty”105. 
One could also cite the recent trend towards “discrimination reasoning” in recent tax 
cases brought to the attention of the Court106. 
In its case law on restrictions on use in the free movement of goods the ECJ 
maintained the distinction between rules on selling arrangements and product 
requirements but also acknowledged the role of the dichotomy as a form of evidence-
suppressing rule. In Commission v. Italy (prohibition on mopeds) the Court noted that 
settled case law on Article 34 TFEU  
“reflects the obligation to respect the principles of non-discrimination and of 
mutual recognition of products lawfully manufactures and marketed in other 
Member States, as well as the principle of ensuring free access of Community 
products to national markets”107. 
The Court referred to both the Cassis de Dijon and the Keck and Mithouard 
jurisprudence, signalling that both are good law. It also referred to the principles of 
non-discrimination, mutual recognition and market access, without, however, 
explaining the link between the three concepts.  
In an ambiguously drafted paragraph, the Court observed, with regard to 
selling arrangements, that 
“[…] measures adopted by a Member State the object of which is to treat 
products coming from other member States less favourably are to be regarded 
as measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions on imports 
within the meaning of Article [34 TFEU]108”, 
It noted that the same principle applies to rules that lay down product requirements. 
In the final sentence, the Court added that “any other measure which hinders access 
                                                 
105
 Joined Cases C-544/03 & C-545/03, Mobistar v. Commune de Fléron [2005] ECR I-7723. 
106
 Karen Banks, ‘The application of the fundamental freedoms to Member State tax measures: 
guarding against protectionism or second-guessing national policy choices’, (2008) EL Rev 482; 
Jochen Meulman & Henry de Waele, ‘A Retreat from Säger? Servicing or Fine-Tuning the Application 
of Article 49 EC’ (2006) 33 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 207. 
107
 Case C-110/05, Commission v. Italian Republic, [2009] ECR I-519 , para 18. 
108
 Ibid., at para 37. 
 35 
 
of products originating in other member States to the market of a Member State is 
also covered by that concept”109. 
 The Court’s analysis is enigmatic. It is clear that there is an attempt to 
establish a conceptual link between the standards applying to product requirements 
and those applying to selling arrangements. The Court reads directly the disparate 
impact standard into the rules applying to product requirements, thus indicating that 
paragraphs fifteen and sixteen of Keck do not refer to two distinct decision criteria: 
obstacle to trade and discrimination, but to the same one. The presumption of 
incompatibility to Article 34 TFEU of rules on product requirements should thus be 
understood as an evidence-suppressing rule. Rules on product requirements are 
presumed to produce a discriminatory impact on the access of imported goods to the 
market. The justification for this presumption is fully supported by the Stiglerian 
analysis on barriers to entry (or trade). 
 The last sentence of the paragraph presents more interpretative challenges, 
as the Court did not clearly explain to which “other” measures that hinder access of 
products originating in other member states” it was referring to, as well as to which 
“concept” covering “also” these measures it alluded. The Court might have intended 
to include in this third category restrictions on the use of goods, such as the 
prohibition for employing mopeds for towing a trailer. These should be treated 
according to the same standard than product requirements or measures (selling 
arrangements) that treat products coming from other member States less favourably 
than domestic products. By referring to “that concept”, the Court essentially indicates 
that (discriminatory) hindrance of market access (for imported goods) constitutes the 
common conceptual framework for all categories of measures, even if a differential 
evidential burden might apply for each specific category.  
 It is easy to understand why rules on product requirements have a disparate 
impact on imported products, by employing the Stiglerian framework for barriers to 
entry, which was explained below. But the application of this framework for 
restrictions on use of products is challenging. The latter tend to be comparable “in 
terms of the nature and the intensity of their effects on trade in goods” to selling 
arrangements, as AG Kokott noted in her Opinion in Percy Mickelsson110. What thus 
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justifies the application of the same presumption of incompatibility to Article 34 TFEU 
than for rules on product requirements?  
In Commission v. Italy (prohibition on mopeds), the Court examined the effect 
of the provision of the Italian Highway code prohibiting the use of a motorcycle and a 
trailer together and distinguished between the situation of trailers that were not 
specifically designed for motorcycles, but intended to be towed by automobiles and 
other types of vehicle, and that of trailers specifically designed to be towed by 
motorcycles. The Court found that the Commission had not established that the 
prohibition hindered access to the market for the first type of trailer111. The Court 
assumed that there was a weak causal link between the regulation and the alleged 
hindrance to market access, as it was possible to use the trailers for other vehicles 
and purposes. The situation was different for the trailers that were specially designed 
to be towed by motorcycles, as the possibilities for their use, other than with 
motorcycles, was found “very limited”, “inappropriate”, “insignificant, if not 
hypothetical”112. The Court did not, however, limit itself to presume the obstacle to 
trade from the restriction on the use of the product. It further explained that 
“(i)t should be noted in that regard that a prohibition on the use of a product in 
the territory of a Member State has a considerable influence on the behaviour 
of consumers, which, in its turn, affects the access of that product to the 
market of that Member State”113. 
Indeed, “consumers, knowing that they are not permitted to use their motorcycle with 
a trailer specially designed for it, have practically no interest in buying such a 
trailer”114. The prohibition in question had the effect to prevent demand “from existing 
in the market for such trailers and therefore hinders their importation”115. 
 The reference by the Court to the effect of the restriction on the behaviour of 
consumers emphasizes the fact that between the two situations trailers are used, the 
difference is of qualitative not of quantitative nature. The Court did not focus on the 
effect of the restriction on the volume of imports of the product, as the volume 
affected might be more important in the case of trailers not designed to be towed by 
motorcycles, if these attract the largest part of the consumer demand for trailers, but 
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on the ability of the measure to influence the behaviour of consumers and restrict 
consumers’ choice. This has important implications as it includes, for the first time, in 
defining the existence of a MEQR a direct reference to the effects of the measure on 
the demand side, the consumers, and not only on the supply side, the 
importers/foreign suppliers. The aim of market integration is to ensure access of the 
product to the consumers. Any measure that might jeopardize this access would fall 
under the scope of Article 34 TFEU. As the ECJ noted in Percy Mickelsson this could 
happen if, because of the “scope” of the restriction on the use of the product, 
consumers, “knowing that the use permitted by such regulations is very limited”, will 
“have only a limited interest in buying that product”116. AG Poiares Maduro also 
explained in Alfa Vita that “the fundamental objective of the principle of free 
movement of goods is to ensure that producers are put in a position to benefit, in fact, 
from the right to carry out their activity at a cross-border level, while consumers are 
put in a position to access, in practice, products from other member States in the 
same conditions as domestic products”117. This emphasis on consumer choice, as a 
constitutive part of the Internal Market project, can also be found in the most recent 
case law of the ECJ on the application of competition law and its interaction with the 
principle of market integration118. 
It is nevertheless unclear how this emphasis on the behaviour of consumers 
relates to the concept of the “disparate impact on market access test”, which 
constitutes, as explained below, the cornerstone of the application of Article 34 
TFEU. In its most recent judgement in Commission v. French Republic, the Court had 
no difficulties to find that a French measure imposing a prior authorization scheme, 
for precautionary reasons, by reference to the potential health risks of certain 
categories of processing aids, constituted in itself a MEQR119. The Court noted that 
the prior authorization scheme “makes it more costly and difficult, or, in certain cases, 
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impossible, to market processing aids and foodstuffs in the preparation of which 
processing aids lawfully manufactured and/or marketed in other member States have 
been used”120, thus continuing to rely on the Stiglerian framework of discriminatory 
barriers to trade. Is the consumer-oriented test of the case law on restrictions on use 
coherent with the discriminatory market access test that the Court applies for other 
types of measures?  
A possible reconciliation of these two strands of case law requires again a 
consideration of the competitive situation to which the imported product is subject to.  
First, the imported product might be in competition with a similar or competing 
domestic production. A MEQR would exist each time the host State regulates in a 
way that imposes to this economic operator (additional) costs that are not incurred by 
competing domestic production. Reference to additional costs raises of course the 
question of which comparator is adopted in order to consider that these costs are 
additional. Although the case law of the Court is not very clear on that, it seems that, 
for the application of Article 34 TFEU, at least since Keck, there is an implicit 
comparison made to the costs incurred by the domestic product, and not a 
comparison made to the cost structure of the foreign product when this is 
commercialized in the home State. This does not mean that the plaintiff should 
proceed to a concrete comparative analysis of the impact of the regulation on the 
costs of specific imported and domestic products. It is possible to perform a more 
abstract assessment of the costs imposed on the domestic production, the latter 
conceived as a distinct conceptual category. For example, there is no need to 
examine that a restriction on advertising would affect more imported products than 
specific competing domestic products. It is assumed that “domestic production” is 
generally better known to local consumers than the imported products. This is not 
always true, as some domestic products might be less known to consumers than 
imported products, but, in general, it is reasonable to make this assumption for the 
general category of “domestic products”. 
Second, the imported product might not be in competition with any similar or 
domestic production. Its access to the market would aim to satisfy an existing (but 
still unsatisfied) or potential consumer demand. It is possible that the importer would 
have to promote the product in a manner that will contribute to the emergence of this 
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potential consumer demand. These situations of potential consumer demand enter 
into consideration in the enforcement of Article 34 TFEU, precisely because of the 
“market building” aim of the Internal Market project. All that matters is that an 
economic operator sees an opportunity to introduce a new product, lawfully 
commercialized in a home State. In this situation, it would be difficult to perform a 
comparative analysis of the additional costs imposed by the regulation on the 
domestic production in order to decide if the host state’s regulation “prevents” market 
access or “impedes more” the market access of imported products. An option would 
be to employ a counterfactual test and assess the costs of the imported products in 
the absence of the specific host state’s regulation. But it is mathematically certain in 
this case that the measure will always be qualified as a MEQR.  
A possible way out would be to adopt a demand-oriented, as opposed to 
supply-oriented, test, which would look to a possible protectionist manipulation by the 
host Member State of the behaviour of the consumers. Host States may act with a 
protectionist intent either by raising the costs of the imported products or by limiting 
consumer demand for them. The result is the same: imports would be less than in the 
absence of these measures. But what constitutes protectionist manipulation of the 
behaviour of the consumers? If one adopts a broad interpretation of this term, there is 
the risk that policies that reduce overall consumer demand (e.g. salary or social 
benefit cuts, tax increases etc) in order to increase international competitiveness 
might fall within the scope of Article 34 TFEU. Undoubtedly, the effect of these 
measures would be to reduce consumer demand and consequently imports, 
compared to the situation that these measures were not adopted. Such a broad 
interpretation would restrict considerably the policy space for Member States and 
would extend the scope of the Internal Market provisions to areas of core economic 
policy (i.e. income tax system, regulation of labour wages), which have been carefully 
kept outside the scope of the negative integration provisions of the Treaty.  
A restrictive interpretation of the term would focus instead on the existence of 
a significant impact of the measure on consumer behaviour and choice. Only 
measures which lead to a limited interest or “practically no interest” of the consumer 
for the imported product would fall, prima facie, within the scope of Article 34 TFEU 
and could lead to a reversal of the evidential burden of proof to the host Member 
States for justifications. These do not only include restrictions on the use of the 
products, but also rules on promotion strategies and other selling arrangements that 
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make it impossible or excessively difficult for imported products to enter the host 
member State’s market. Of course, there should be a causal link between the 
measure and the limited interest of the consumers: the measure is likely to affect the 
behaviour of consumers. In my opinion, this should be a but-for causality test. 
Otherwise, the scope of the prohibition of Article 34 TFEU would be too broad and 
would include efficient restrictions of trade. The emphasis of the Court on the 
“considerable influence in the behaviour of consumers” supports this reading.  
This interpretation is also compatible with the distinction established by the 
ECJ in Keck and Mithouard between measures that prevent market access and those 
that impede the market access of imported products more than they do for domestic 
products. Both criteria refer to the same concept: the existence of a discriminatory 
restriction on the market access of foreign products. If a measure imposes some 
costs on the imported product, this is not sufficient for the application of Article 34 
TFEU. The claimant should prove that the regulation imposes costs on the imported 
product that are not (or have not been) incurred by the domestic product. If it is not 
possible to perform a comparative analysis of costs, because there is no similar or 
competing domestic product, the claimant should prove that the measure in question 
had a considerable impact on the behaviour of the consumers, as a result of which 
the latter have practically no interest or considerably less interest to purchase it. This 
analysis is not limited to situations where there is a restriction on the use of the 
product but applies also for rules on selling arrangements where there is no 
competing domestic production. I imply that use restrictions can have also the effect 
of influencing the production of these products in the host state at the first place, as it 
is unlikely that there would be domestic production for products consumers would 
find of little or of practically no use. 
It is too early to conclude on the path followed by the jurisprudence of the 
Court. I attempted to demonstrate that my analytical framework is compatible with the 
most recent case law of the Court on the free movement of goods and could be also 
defended from a policy perspective. The Bainian definition of barriers to trade that 
was initiated by the Court’s judgement in Dassonville and latter refined in Cassis de 
Dijon in order to accommodate efficient restrictions of trade has led to unacceptable 
policy consequences and transformed Article 34 TFEU to a deregulatory tool. The 
position of the Court in Keck marked the turn towards a different interpretation of the 
concept of MEQR, which I think can be better explained by reference to Stigler’s 
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comparative burdens methodology. The focus is, like in the internal taxation 
(pecuniary measures) cases, on the effect of the measure on the competitive relation 
between the foreign and the domestic product121. In the context of Article 34 TFEU, 
the Court introduced a formalistic distinction between product requirements and 
selling arrangements. The dichotomy has the function to reduce decision making 
costs while ensuring that error costs are limited122 and to achieve a sensible re-
allocation of the evidential burden of proof, as explained below. The recent case law 
on the restrictions on the use of the products shows the limits of the comparative 
methodology, in the absence of domestic production, even conceived as an abstract 
category. Refocusing the analysis from the supply side to the demand side provides 
a workable tool that might also respond to the broader legitimacy concerns that are 
raised by the enforcement of the free movement provisions of the Treaty to state 
action and the quest for a more holistic approach in the interpretation of Article 34 
TFEU. 
A possible objection to the application of this framework is the relatively 
ambiguous position of the Court’s jurisprudence on the application of the 
discriminatory market access test in other freedoms of movement. There is some 
recent case law on the free movement of services which supports this analytical 
framework123, but also judgements that seem to take a different perspective. 
In Commission v. Italian Republic (insurance) the Court of Justice considered 
that a national legislation imposing an obligation to contract with all vehicle owners 
for all insurance undertakings operating in the field of third-party liability motor vehicle 
insurance, constituted a restriction to the freedom to provide services124. But the 
conceptual framework employed did not provide adequate guidance. The Court 
certainly noted that “rules of a Member State do not constitute a restriction within the 
meaning of the EC Treaty solely by virtue of the fact that other Member States apply 
less strict, or more commercially favorable rules to providers of similar services 
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established in their territory”125, an indication that the free movement provisions of the 
Treaty do not have a deregulatory aim. The Court explained that such rules render 
“access to the Italian market less attractive” and that, even if foreign undertakings 
obtain access to that market, it “reduces the ability of the undertakings concerned to 
compete effectively from the outset, against undertakings traditionally established in 
Italy”126. This clearly takes up the thesis defended in this study that the objective of 
the negative market integration rules is to sanction measures that have an impact on 
the competitive relation between the home State’s products/undertakings and the 
host State’s products/undertakings. The Court blurs nevertheless its analysis with a 
rights-based approach. The imposition by a member State of an obligation to contract 
is found to constitute “a substantial interference in the freedom of contract which 
economic operators, in principle, enjoy”127. I am unable to see what this rights-based 
approach offers to the Court’s reasoning. The Court adds to this peculiar conceptual 
mixture a Bainian touch by insisting that the measure in question is likely to lead, “in 
terms of organization and investment, to significant costs for such undertakings”, 
which will be required “to re-think their business policy and strategy”128. The fact that 
incumbent undertakings have also incurred these costs is simply not examined.  
This raises concerns over the application of a coherent framework for all free 
movement rules. This topic is outside the scope of this study129 but I would simply 
advance the view that the quest for conceptual coherence across the free movement 
rules is a quixotic exercise. The different levels of achievement of an integrated 
market in goods, services, persons, and capital, argues against a common 
conceptual framework that could jeopardize the important efforts that are still to be 
made in some freedoms of movement and would unnecessarily burden the more 
flexible approach that has to be adopted in other freedoms of movement130.  
 
IV. Towards a holistic approach of economic integration: implications for 
negative and positive integration 
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The analysis of the first step of the definition of a MEQR, the finding of a 
restriction of trade, has shown the evolution of the case law of the Court from the 
broad “obstacles to trade” concept to a narrower discriminatory impact to market 
access approach. The theoretical underpinnings of the “discriminatory market 
access” test are not, however, settled. The main cause for this lack of conceptual 
coherence is a profound disagreement over the objective of the Internal Market 
project and consequently on the definition of what constitutes a trade restriction 
falling under the first step of Article 34 TFEU. The reference to the consumer/citizen 
in the most recent case law points towards the need for a “holistic” approach in the 
interpretation of Article 34 TFEU. 
 
A. The case for a holistic approach in the interpretation of Article 34 TFEU 
 
 According to one view, the Internal Market project aims to promote intra-
Community trade by imposing an equal regulatory burden to firms across the Union. 
This can be either achieved through negative integration, by striking down national 
rules that do not take into account the regulatory burden already incurred in the home 
state and by imposing additional costs to imported goods, or through positive 
integration, by agreeing uniform rules applying to both the home and the host state. 
Positive and negative integration are thus complements for achieving an equal level-
playing field for undertakings, when engaged in intra-Community competition131. The 
principle of functional parallelism imposes a presumption broadening the scope of the 
negative integration provisions, while mandatory requirements subject to the 
proportionality principle are seen as an opportunity to refocus the positive integration 
process on the regulatory disparities that are most problematic, in the sense that they 
impose an unequal regulatory burden to undertakings.  
The matrix includes only the pay offs of two actors of the integration process, 
their interests seen in opposition to each other. First, there are the Member States 
defending their wider public interest, which might also include protectionist economic 
measures or measures that suppress trade opportunities for the satisfaction of other 
preferences than trade facilitation. Second, there is the Union, which has its own 
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utility function, that of establishing an Internal Market where suppliers or service 
providers will be subject to an equal regulatory burden, in case they decide to 
operate across the different national legal orders. This utility function is supply-
oriented, not demand oriented, as consumers’, and more broadly citizens’, interests 
are not directly taken into account. The Union’s interest in establishing an Internal 
Market takes precedence over the Member States’ broader objectives in the EU legal 
order132. 
According to the “obstacles to trade approach”, any national measure that has 
an effect on intra-community trade is subject to judicial control under the second step 
of the analysis. The exception to the prohibition principle in Article 36 TFEU creates a 
limited immunity for a specific and exhaustive list of public interest objectives. The 
proportionality test, which takes the form of a strict LRA test, ensures that intra-
community trade is not affected more than what is strictly required for the 
accomplishment of these objectives. The existence of Article 36 TFEU constitutes, 
however, a serious conceptual challenge for the defenders of the view that the 
objective of economic integration is to promote intra-Community trade: if intra-
community trade should be the first-order preference of the EU, why is it sacrificed in 
order to achieve second-order, in terms of the EU hierarchy of norms, preferences of 
Member States for public health, public morality, public security, protection of IP 
rights etc? A possible argument defending the conceptual coherence of Article 36 
TFEU would be that protecting these objectives enhances intra-Community trade in 
the long run as it increases ultimately trade opportunities, because it boosts 
consumers’ confidence (i.e. public health) and dynamic efficiency (i.e. intellectual 
property rights). It is nevertheless difficult to see how all the public interests listed in 
Article 36 TFEU might promote intra-community trade.  
The principle of positive integration and the harmonization of the public 
interest requirement at the EU level attempt also to immunize from the application of 
the “obstacles to trade approach”, those public interest objectives that are shared by 
a qualified majority or the unanimity of Member States. Nevertheless, the scope of 
the harmonization principle is circumscribed to the accomplishment of the utility 
function of the EU, the constitution of the Internal Market. As it has been explained by 
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the ECJ in the Tobacco Advertising Directive judgement, the Community does not 
have a general regulatory competence but an attributed competence to harmonize 
regulation, to the extent necessary to improve the conditions and functioning of the 
Internal Market and to prevent the emergence of future obstacles to trade133.  In 
conclusion, according to this view, the complementary character of the negative and 
positive integration indicates that the objective of the Internal Market is to facilitate 
cross-border trade by reducing regulatory diversity. This is the main thrust of the 
process of economic integration through law.  
This view presents a number of conceptual difficulties. Ironically, reducing 
regulatory diversity will not lead to greater volumes of trade, trade facilitation or 
increased part of imports and exports in commerce. Regulatory uniformity might lead 
to fewer imports, because the costs of the imported goods would be similar to those 
of the home state. For example, regulatory diversity in setting the price of 
pharmaceutical products leads to higher volumes of parallel imports and 
consequently trade between Member States, than in the absence of regulatory 
diversity. Regulatory diversity increases the opportunities of cross-border trade. This 
view does not also accommodate the fact that the Treaty prohibits measures and 
policies that may increase the volume of intra-community trade. For example, export 
subsidies are banned, despite the positive effect that these might bring to interstate 
trade. Restrictions of trade from pecuniary measures are also subject to a standard 
that does not extend the prohibition rule to internal taxation that is non-protectionist 
but could potentially reduce intra-Community trade and imports, for example, 
because it reduces income previously available for purchasing foreign products. A 
coherent interpretation of the constraints imposed by the Treaty to Member States’ 
action would thus require aligning the standards applying to internal taxation with 
those applying to regulatory action. Of course, Member States’ power in the area of 
internal taxation has been jealously preserved, because of the symbolic link between 
taxation and national or Parliamentary sovereignty in modern democracies. But, this 
power has also been seriously curtailed in the area of state aids, where no distinction 
has ever been made between taxation and regulation/service provision, with regard 
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to the standards applied to the different types of state action, as long as the State 
confers a specific advantage to an industry and creates a distortion of competition134. 
It is submitted that Article 34 TFEU should cover only inefficient restrictions of 
trade. The objective of economic integration should be efficiency, broadly defined, 
not just a specific facet of efficiency, the promotion of intra-community trade. My 
conception of efficiency recognizes that the utility function of the EU should integrate 
a variety of preferences other than productive (or allocative) efficiency. A simple 
reference to Articles 2 and 3(3) TEU sufficiently illustrates how a narrow view of 
efficiency is incompatible with the text of the Treaty135 and the concept of “social 
market economy”136. The “obstacles to trade approach” is thus ill-suited for the 
completion of the utility function of the EU, as it includes within the scope of Article’s 
34 TFEU prohibition, state measures that impose an efficient restriction of trade: i.e. 
a measure that reduces opportunities of intra-community trade but promotes, at the 
same time, the protection of the environment137. As explained in the previous section, 
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this approach requires a definition of MEQR that is narrower than the “obstacles to 
trade approach” and does not infer the existence of a MEQR from the simple fact that 
the state regulation in question imposes additional costs to foreign products. It is, 
however, crucial that the first step of the analysis of a restriction of trade under Article 
34 TFEU is not seen in isolation, but forms part of a more global approach that 
integrates the different possibilities of justification of efficient restrictions of trade, 
available to Member States, the evidential arrangements introduced by the Treaty 
(Article 36 TFEU) and the case law (mandatory requirements, the product 
requirements/selling arrangements dichotomy) and positive integration.  
 
B. The implications of the holistic approach on the judicial assessment of 
the justifications of efficient restrictions of trade 
 
 The evolution of the jurisprudence of the ECJ in the area of free movement of 
goods has been marked by the progressive inclusion of other considerations than the 
initial emphasis on cross-border trade facilitation. The possibility for the States to 
justify obstacles to trade and therefore to avoid to be found in infringement of Article 
34 TFEU shows that deregulating trade has never been the aim of the free 
movement provisions, although the broad interpretation of the concept of MEQR by 
the Court has led AG Tesauro to ask in Hűnermund if the objective of Article 34 
TFEU was “to liberalize intra-Community trade or if it was intended more generally to 
encourage the unhindered pursuit of commerce in individual Member States”138. But 
this was essentially a rhetorical question. Public interest objectives have always been 
integrated in the application of free movement rules through the doctrine of 
mandatory requirements of general interest or through the formal Treaty exceptions 
and can justify all forms of obstacles to trade, including directly discriminatory 
restrictions of trade in specific circumstances. 
Furthermore, contrary to what is generally thought, the principle of mutual 
recognition does not aim to remove barriers to trade or to enable regulatory 
                                                                                                                                                        
substance”. Barnard argues that non-discriminatory national regulation should benefit from the 
presumption of legality, while discriminatory (in law or in fact) legislation should be examined under the 
broad “obstacles to trade” approach. 
138
 Opinion of AG Tesauro in Case C-297/92, Hűnermund [1993] ECR I-6787. 
 48 
 
competition. Kalypso Nicolaidis139 and most recently Wolfgang Kerber with Roger van 
den Bergh have convincingly argued that mutual recognition should be seen as a 
conflict of law rule that aims instead to delineate the regulatory powers of jurisdictions 
and to test whether the traditional national regulatory autonomy is still defensible or if 
decentralization should be replaced by another allocation of regulatory powers that 
can either take the form of “centralization (including measures of harmonization) or a 
free market for regulations (free choice of law)”140. Commenting on the Cassis de 
Dijon judgement of the ECJ, Kerber and Van den Bergh note that “if the French and 
German regulations are assessed under the principle of mutual recognition as being 
equivalent for the consumers, why should domestic producers remain obliged to obey 
specific national rules? Why should domestic producers under a rule of mutual 
recognition not be allowed to produce according to regulations of other Member 
States and sell these products – appropriately labelled - on the domestic markets?”141 
The principle of mutual recognition is not aiming to facilitate trade but to provide 
direction as to the most adequate allocation of regulatory powers between the centre 
and the periphery. A wide divergence of regulatory preferences between Member 
States, because of different values, would make unmanageable the operation of the 
principle of mutual recognition. The mutual recognition principle does not oppose a 
holistic approach that would integrate the pursuit of other objectives of public interest 
than trade facilitation.  
 The possibility for Member States to justify obstacles to trade with mandatory 
requirements of general interest, even if these are directly discriminatory142, 
illustrates the role that other public interests play in the Internal Market and support 
the holistic view on economic integration. How the integration of these other 
objectives takes place is of particular importance, as in case their role is ancillary to 
the principle of free movement, that could be an obstacle to the holistic view of 
economic integration defended in this study. 
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The jurisprudence of the ECJ has long adopted a proportionality test in the 
examination of the public interest reasons argued by the States143. As it has been 
exposed below, this comprises a finality test, a test of suitability and a test of 
necessity. The finality test examines the general lawfulness of the alleged aim of the 
measure: is the objective among those that Member States have the power to 
pursue? With the exception of circumstances where there has been a complete 
transfer of the power to act by the Member State to the European Union, because of 
an exhaustive harmonization that pre-empts Member States’ action, State regulation 
passes without any difficulty this first test. The suitability test requires some articulate 
relationship between the means chosen by the host State and the objective of public 
interest pursued: the means should be suitable or appropriate. The necessity test 
examines if the measure is no more restrictive than necessary to achieve a lawful 
end.  
The enforcement of these tests does not lead to any balancing stricto sensu, 
in the sense that there is a weighing of conflicting reasons144. The analysis is closer 
to a means/end testing, where the courts examine only the capacity of the State 
measure to achieve the objective sought with the lower impact on the EU principle of 
free movement. The Court does not, in any case, take into account the costs and 
benefits of the national measure or those of the principle of free movement with 
regard to a third term. This approach guarantees the incommensurability of the 
principle of free movement, as the latter is not subject to any comparative quantitative 
analysis and is accepted as part of the “economic constitution” of the EU, which 
serves to provide the “framework of principles and ideals”145 through which the 
economic system develops. Such approach would contradict the holistic view. 
Another route usually followed by the jurisprudence of the Court is to 
recognize that the principle of free movement becomes a source of individual rights 
that are granted against public powers146. An individual has the right to exercise an 
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economic activity by selling products or services across the border. The 
constitutionalization process awards to the provisions on free movement a normative 
status equivalent to that of fundamental rights. Employing the terminology of 
fundamental “freedoms”147 or rights might serve a dual objective.  
First, it might indicate the elevation of the free movement rules to the status of 
fundamental freedoms/rights guaranteeing open markets that can be restricted by 
national measures only in exceptional circumstances. This constitutionalization 
transforms the free movement provisions into an economic due-process clause that 
restricts the regulatory activity of Member States. Recognizing these economic 
fundamental freedoms to individuals is perceived as a way to enhance the legitimacy 
of EU law and to achieve the objectives of the Internal Market project, in terms of 
unfettered inter-state commerce. The proportionality principle accommodates this 
rights-based approach by assessing each freedom on its own terms, without the 
need to compare incommensurable values. It operates as a means-end rationality 
review test: the focus of the judicial review is to examine the logical (suitability test) 
and empirical (necessity test) link between means and ends. The third step of the 
analysis, the Least Restrictive Alternative (LRA) test, does not require the court to 
make comparisons of value: a law will be invalidated only if there is an alternative 
that achieves all the benefits of the examined regulation at a lower cost for the 
protected right. The application of the proportionality test by the jurisprudence of the 
Court would thus be compatible with the perception of the freedom of movement as 
an incommensurable and inalienable right. Efficiency, broadly construed, would not 
be the aim of the Internal Market rules. Any exceptions to the protection of the right 
are strictly confined to exceptional grounds. 
The conflict between the EU principle of free movement and fundamental 
rights protected by national constitutions has been the laboratory where this 
conception of the Internal Market has been tested. In Schmidberger148, 
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Familiapress149, Omega150, Viking151, Laval152 and Rüffert153  the Court was 
confronted to the opposition between the principle of free movement, perceived as a 
“fundamental freedom”, and different political and social rights, such as freedom of 
expression, the right of collective action, protected by the Constitutions of the 
Member States. In some of these cases the Court applied the proportionality test and 
indicated that it is for the national court to determine whether the specific state 
regulation was aiming to protect the fundamental right and whether this objective 
could have been attained by measures less restrictive for both intra-Community trade 
and fundamental rights154. The proportionality principle which applied in these cases 
is less concentrated on the imperative of free movement than the usual case law of 
the Court, which focuses only the protection of the freedom of movement.  
The Court employs the language of “balancing” in order to explain how it 
reconciles the freedom of movement with the fundamental rights, through the 
proportionality test155. But qualifying the proportionality test to a form of balancing is 
misleading. The test does not require the comparison of the benefits and burdens 
imposed on each fundamental right by the specific state measure in order to decide 
where to strike the balance between the value of trade and other values. The value of 
trade is perceived as superior, simply because it is given a constitutional level 
protection by the Treaty, while the other values are national and thus inferior in the 
hierarchy of norms.156 The integration of the Charter of fundamental rights to the 
Treaty on the European Union (TEU)157, following the Lisbon Treaty might 
nevertheless have a transformative effect on the nature of the proportionality test and 
could establish a systematic review of the enforcement of the free movement rules 
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and their relation to fundamental rights and freedoms, guaranteed now an equal 
place at the EU level158.  
Second, the necessity to reconcile the freedom of movement rules with 
individual fundamental rights, and not just regulatory action, in the recent case law of 
the Court, has led to a re-conceptualization of the proportionality test as an interests-
balancing exercise. In Alfa Vita, AG Poiares Maduro invited the Court to abandon the 
“classic approach” and to integrate the freedoms of movement into the “broader 
framework of the objectives of the Internal Market and European citizenship”159. 
According to AG Poiares Maduro, “it would be neither satisfactory nor true to the 
development of the case-law to reduce freedom of movement to a mere standard of 
promotion of trade between Member States”160. The freedoms of movement should 
“represent the cross border dimension of the economic and social status conferred 
on European citizens”161. Indeed, “the protection of such a status requires going 
beyond guaranteeing that there will be no discrimination based on nationality”162. It 
requires from Member States to take into account “the effect of the measures they 
adopt on the position of all European union citizens wishing to assert their rights to 
freedom of movement” and thus to consider “a broader scale than a strictly national 
context”163.  Consequently, “the task of the Court is not to call into question as a 
matter of course Member States’ economic policies”, but to make sure that “those 
States do not adopt measures which, in actual fact, lead to cross-border situations 
being treated less favourably than purely national situations”164.  
His analysis, although confined to the first step of the assessment of MEQR, 
has implications on the kind of judicial control performed on the justifications 
proffered by the States, under the second step of the analysis. His position is 
explained by the “virtual representation” argument165, he also defended in his work 
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“We, The Court”, where he argued for an approach that would focus on the interests, 
not the rights, of the different economic actors and crucially “the position and 
interests of all market agents (both producers and consumers)”, foreign and 
domestic166. 
This interest-balancing rhetoric has profound implications on the conception of 
European economic integration. States are left with the autonomy to perform 
cost/benefit analysis on the basis of different values and different measurement 
mechanisms. A certain degree of regulatory diversity is unavoidable. Indeed, as 
Poiares Maduro observes, “different institutions may reach different and equally 
legitimate and efficient balances of the values concerned”167. But crucially, this 
“national” cost/benefit analysis is subject to limits and constraints intended to 
introduce the interests of foreign nationals into the national making process168. These 
limits erode Member States’ regulatory autonomy, when externalities imposed on 
foreign interests are not internalized and thus do not influence the regulatory choices 
of the host state. But how this misrepresentation of foreign interests should reflect on 
the judicial assessment of State justifications? According to Poiares Maduro, “the 
Court of Justice should not second-guess national regulatory choices, but should 
instead ensure that there is no under-representation of the interests of nationals of 
other member States in the national political process”169. If the specific regulation 
affects both cross-national and national interests, it will not prima facie fall within the 
scope of Article 34 TFEU, unless it is shown to be discriminatory. The Court of 
Justice will thus review national regulatory measures “where there is a suspicion of 
representative malfunction in the national political process with regard to nationals of 
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other Member States”170. In all other cases, national regulatory choices will be 
reviewed by the EU political process (positive integration)171. 
These recommendations advance a narrower reading of the first step of the 
analysis, by introducing a requirement of discriminatory impact on cross-national 
trade for the State measure to be subject to judicial assessment. They also commend 
a specific form of judicial review at the second step of the analysis, which will 
examine if foreign interests were taken into account in the national decision-making 
process. Both strings of his theory are based on the virtual representation argument: 
the fact that the regulation produces a disparate impact on foreign trade is prima 
facie evidence of a misrepresentation of foreign interests in the process. 
Consequently, the evidential burden of proof is reversed to the State and national 
measures are subject to the scrutiny of the Court, under the second step of the 
assessment. The Court examines more closely if foreign interests were 
misrepresented. An efficient exchange would thus require from the Courts to 
intervene in order to virtually represent the omitted foreign “restricted” interests. This 
can take either the form of a proper balancing test that will evaluate the local benefits 
and the foreign costs and then assess their respective weight, or an “institutional 
malfunctions” test. Both rely on the operation of the discrimination test as a filter for 
subjecting state regulations to a degree of judicial scrutiny. An explicit 
domestic/foreign classification or the presence of a disparate impact on foreign 
competition might constitute evidence of discrimination. The use of means that are 
not the least trade restrictive might also be used as an indication that the purpose of 
the national measure is to discriminate against inter-state trade, in the second step of 
the assessment.  
The virtual representation argument presents, however, many flaws. Donald 
Regan has shown how foreign interests are often accounted for by local interests in 
decision-making172. The interests of the local consumers might indeed be affected by 
a regulation that favours local producers and harms foreign producers/suppliers. But 
a strict environmental regulation that is indistinctly applicable will also affect local 
suppliers of products whose production is not compatible with the stricter 
environmental standards and who might be either obliged to increase their costs 
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considerably and thus lose market share or to exit the market. It might also affect 
local consumers that are unable to buy the more expensive environmentally-friendly 
products. These local interests will oppose their home state’s regulation, as its effect 
will decrease their welfare, and by doing so, they will represent the foreign interests 
in the domestic political process. There is a vicarious consideration of the foreign 
producers’ interests by the integration in the analysis of local consumers’ and/or 
some local suppliers’ interests. The presence of such local interests leads to what 
Regan calls, “local/global equivalence”, which completely undercuts the virtual 
representation argument173.  
It is also doubtful if courts have the competence to identify benefits and costs 
in practice and to decide how local benefits to the environment can be weighed 
against a foreign loss of jobs. As the main mechanism to identify citizens’ 
preferences, the legislative power might be a more adequate institution than the 
courts to optimize over all interests174. 
It is thus crucial to examine the jurisprudence of the Court in order to unveil 
the approach followed. The consideration of the consumer interest in finding the 
existence of a MEQR has been an important leitmotiv of the most recent case law of 
the Court. But the consumer is also a citizen that has a variety of preferences that do 
not always relate to lower prices and wider choice. The protection of the environment, 
paternalistic regulation that aims to mitigate the behavioural biases of consumers and 
informational asymmetry, cultural diversity, a higher degree of public health and 
social protection, freedom of expression are some examples of broader preferences 
of the citizen/consumer that should also come into consideration. A trade exchange 
would be efficient, only if it integrates these multiple preferences and values.  
The proportionality principle applied by the Court to review restrictions to 
trade, integrates, however, a LRA test that imposes strict conditions for a state 
measure to escape the prohibition of Article 34 TFEU, even if the aim and effect of 
the measure is to promote efficient trade. The Court examines if there is a least 
restrictive alternative measure that could achieve the public interest objective, as part 
of its analysis on the necessity of the measure. The Court has gone as far as to 
impose a procedural requirement to the authorities of home States to carry out a 
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careful investigation on the existence of a less intrusive alternative in the context of 
the proportionality test175. This procedural dimension of the proportionality test takes 
different forms, such as the requirement of judicial review or the requirement for 
national authorities to give reasons for the decisions they adopt176, both restricting 
any risk of arbitrariness (non-integration of foreign interests) in the national decision-
making process. It is clear that the underlying objective of this case law is to respond 
to the virtual representation argument. 
There are two versions of the LRA test177. A law could be invalidated if an 
alternative regulation achieves most of the benefits at lower cost for trade. This 
constitutes a “loose LRA test”, which limits the Member State’s discretion to fully 
satisfy other preferences than the expansion of trade. The regulatory discretion of the 
Member State will be compromised by the finding that a less restrictive to trade 
alternative would achieve some (not all) the benefits expected by the regulation. On 
the contrary, a “strict LRA test” would require that the regulatory alternative provides 
all the benefits brought by the regulation under examination as well as being less 
restrictive of trade178.  
The Court has generally applied the “loose LRA test”. In Familiapress179, it 
required from the national court performing the proportionality review of the 
prohibition of including prize competitions in magazines to examine whether national 
law could have required merely the simple removal of the page on which the prize 
competition appeared. In Commission v. Germany180, the Court suggested that the 
consumer interest could have been preserved by less restrictive to trade alternatives, 
such as the compulsory affixing of suitable labels giving the nature of the product 
sold, without any consideration that labelling might not have offered a similar level of 
protection of the consumer interest, in particular for consumers unable to read or 
used to such a high level of consumer protection in their jurisdictions that they do not 
systematically read labels. The Court has adopted a similar application of the LRA 
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test in some of its Article 36 TFEU case law on the protection of public health181. In 
other cases the ECJ has put more emphasis on the wide discretion Member States 
dispose in the field of public health and the application of the precautionary 
principle182 or it considered that the alternative measure should be “equally 
appropriate” in order to achieve the specific public interest, taking into account the 
monitoring costs and the difficulties of implementation183.  
An important difference between the “strict LRA” and the “loose LRA” is that 
the first does not require the courts to make comparisons of value, while this could be 
the case for the second one. As Donald Regan explains, the “loose LRA” test can be 
compared to a form of intuitive balancing or a proportionality review stricto sensu: 
balancing focuses on whether “the costs of preferring the actual law to the alternative 
are greater than the benefits” while proportionality stricto sensu on “whether the costs 
are disproportionate to the benefits”184. Indeed, the Court applied in some cases a 
covert “marginal balancing test” that balances the value of the national rule against 
the Community interest in free trade, and excluded considerations of public interest 
because the specific measure would have had an excessive effect on trade185. But a 
“loose LRA” test is not similar to a “total effects review”, that is a proper balancing 
test that would evaluate and weigh the costs and the benefits of the state measure 
and would trade them off by implicitly taking as an alternative no state measure 
(rather than a less restrictive state measure)186. 
The most recent case law of the Court has cast doubt on the continuing 
relevance of the “loose LRA” test. In Commission v. Italian Republic187, after finding a 
restriction of trade, the Court moved to consider if the specific measures were 
necessary for the purpose of ensuring road safety, which was the justification of 
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public interest advanced by Italy. It acknowledged that Member States must be 
recognized a margin of appreciation and should be free to determine the degree of 
protection which they wish to apply with regard to such safety concerns. The Court 
continued by noting that 
“(w)hilst it is true that it is for a Member State which invokes an imperative 
requirement as justification for the hindrance to free movement of goods to 
demonstrate that its rules are appropriate and necessary to attain the 
legitimate objective being pursued, that burden of proof cannot be so 
extensive as to require the Member State to prove, positively, that no other 
conceivable measure could enable that objective to be attained under the 
same conditions”188. 
The Court then observed that 
“Member States cannot be denied the possibility of attaining an objective such 
as road safety by the introduction of general and simple rules which will be 
easily understood and applied by drivers and easily managed and supervised 
by the competent authorities”189. 
The implications of this case law are not yet entirely clear. A possible 
interpretation is that the Court intended to share the evidential burden of the 
necessity part of the proportionality test between the Member States and the 
traders/plaintiffs. The Member State should not come forward with a complete 
analysis of why there is no available least restrictive alternative to achieve the degree 
of protection of the specific public interest sought, but could discharge its burden of 
proof by a prima facie case that the specific measure is empirically linked to the 
public interest objective. It would be on the claimants to establish that there is a 
plausible least restrictive alternative that would have provided an equivalent 
protection to the public interest. Alternatively, the Court might have intended to move 
away from a systematic application of a LRA test and to embrace a proper balancing 
analysis. The essence of the Internal Market rules would in this case be transformed, 
from a rights-based model that emphasizes freedom of trade to a framework that 
integrates the variety of preferences of the citizens/consumers for regulatory 
protection of public health, the environment and other “public interest” objectives. 
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In Viking, the Court explicitly embraced the balancing terminology (although 
one could have doubts on its effective application in this case) by noting that 
“(s)ince the Community has thus not only an economic but also social 
purpose, the rights under the provisions of the Treaty on the free movement of 
goods, persons, services and capital must be balanced against the objectives 
pursued by social policy”190. 
The Court subjected collective action to the scope of the free establishment 
provisions by rejecting the view that the Community has no (positive integration) 
competence to regulate social rights and that, therefore, the negative integration 
provisions of the Treaty would not apply. It also rejected the view that collective 
action, perceived as a fundamental right, should exclude the application of a freedom 
of movement. The Court rightly insisted on the social function and the non-absolute 
character of this right, consistent with its previous case law on individual rights (not 
just collective), such as the right to property191. But the Court, unnecessarily in my 
view, took the position also embraced in Schmidberger and Omega, that freedom of 
establishment is a “fundamental freedom” that needs to be reconciled with the 
fundamental right of collective action192, through the application of the proportionality 
principle.  
Such an attempt to treat these two sets of values, social policy and freedom of 
establishment, as equivalent in terms of normative strength in the EU hierarchy of 
norms, is flawed193. First, this is not indispensable for their reconciliation and it might 
be counter-productive. In its previous case law the Court was able to reconcile the 
right to property with competition law, without being obliged to grant to the second a 
fundamental freedom status194. Second, the Court subjects only the fundamental 
right to the principle of proportionality (not the freedom of movement/establishment), 
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thus implying that the freedom of movement would be of a higher order than 
fundamental rights in the hierarchy of norms195. Analyzing fundamental rights as a 
form of mandatory requirement would also preclude the possibility of justifying 
directly discriminatory measures, thus reinforcing the hierarchical nature of the 
relationship between fundamental rights and freedoms. Third, the rhetoric of the 
Court put aside, the test applied has nothing to do with a proper balancing exercise 
that would evaluate both costs and benefits for each value in conflict. The Court 
adopts a LRA test requiring the trade unions to bring evidence that they did not have 
other less restrictive to the freedom of establishment means at their disposal, and 
that “they had exhausted those means before initiating such (collective) action”196.  
One might wonder how it is possible for the Court to take a similar position 
when it comes to circumscribe the limitation of the freedom of movement by a State 
because of a public interest objective than when it is confronted to a conflict between 
a “fundamental freedom” and a “fundamental right”. Certainly, prior to the integration 
of the Charter, fundamental rights were considered as a form of mandatory 
requirements/objective justifications, similar in their legal nature to public policies that 
are not a source for rights. Shouldn’t the integration of the charter lead to a 
differentiation between normal mandatory requirements and fundamental rights? But 
more fundamentally, what does the recognition of the “fundamental” character of the 
right and freedom and the fact that both are of equal constitutional value197 bring to 
the analysis, if the Court continues to apply a LRA test? Wouldn’t a proper balance of 
interests be more adequate than a LRA test in the second case?198.  
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This also contrasts with the Court’s position on the interaction between 
competition law and social protection in Albany, where it excluded collective social 
purpose agreements between employers and employees from the application of 
article 101(1) TFEU199. The case concerned organisations representing employers 
and employees that had collectively agreed to set up a single pension fund 
responsible for managing a supplementary pension scheme and had made requests 
to the public authorities to make affiliation to the fund compulsory. The ECJ referred 
to article 2 TEC as well as to other Treaty provisions providing that the Commission 
had to promote a close cooperation between Member States in the social field and to 
enhance the dialogue between management and labour at the European level. 
Although the Court recognized that “it is beyond question that certain restrictions of 
competition are inherent in collective agreements between organisations 
representing employers and workers”, it also held that “the social policy objectives 
pursued by such agreements would be seriously undermined if management and 
labour were subject to Article [101(1)] of the Treaty when seeking jointly to adopt 
measures to improve the conditions of work and employment”200. It followed “from an 
interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty as a whole” that agreements concluded 
in the context of collective negotiations between management and labour in pursuit of 
such objectives must, by virtue of their nature and purpose, be regarded as falling 
outside the scope of Article 101(1)201. The value of competition had in this case to be 
sacrificed for the attainment of another value, that of social protection.  
It is possible, however, to advance a more competition-friendly reading of this 
case. As AG Jacobs noted in his Opinion in this case “this conclusion in favour of a 
limited antitrust immunity for collective agreements between management and labour 
is not incompatible with the idea that there is no exception for the social field as a 
whole”202. The main difference is that in the case of collective bargaining, the 
exception is based not on the subject-matter of the agreement but mainly on the 
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framework in which it is concluded. These agreements contribute to a measure of 
equilibrium between the bargaining power on both sides, which helps to ensure a 
balanced outcome for both sides and for society as a whole. The countervailing 
bargaining power function of these agreements comes from the fact that the interests 
of employers and employees do not coincide: the obvious conflicting interests of the 
different parties further the public interest203. The Court did not exclude the 
application of competition law because the value of social protection was considered 
superior but simply adopted a decision procedure based on a serial or lexical 
order204. Social protection was considered by the Court as a first principle in the order 
of preferences that should not lead to the elimination of competition (perceived as 
efficiency). Because of the conflicting interests of the employers and employees and 
their self-restraining effect, the agreements were socially valuable (and thus efficient) 
in this case205.  
In Viking, the Court explicitly refused to follow a similar approach206. The 
reasons are not entirely clear, but it seems that in Albany the Court attached 
importance to the fact that the restriction of competition was inherent in the collective 
agreements, and thus the enforcement of competition law would have jeopardised 
their enactment, while this was not a risk to be incurred in Viking for the exercise of 
trade union rights. It was possible to exercise trade union rights without “prejudicing 
to a certain degree” the “fundamental” freedoms of movement207. However, it would 
be impossible to conclude collective agreements without producing effects on wages, 
output, prices etc and thus affect competition and consumers. This is a questionable 
generalization, as all depends on the content of the freedom of movement and in 
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particular the type of restrictions of intra-community trade that fall under the first step 
of the assessment. If this includes any measure that imposes additional costs to 
traders and thus affects their market access (the “obstacles to trade” approach), then 
potentially collective action might lead to that result, the restriction of trade being in 
this case inherent to the exercise of the trade union’s right. If only measures that 
have a disparate effect on the market access of foreign products/services/companies 
fall under the scope of the free movement provisions then the restriction is not 
inherent to the exercise of the collective right. Viking implies that the Court adopted 
the second approach.  
In conclusion, the most recent case law of the Court may signal an evolution 
towards an interpretation of the second step of the assessment that would be more 
inclusive of public interest objectives and fundamental rights, although it is also true 
that the “balancing” rhetoric of the case law has not been followed so far by concrete 
results as to the reconciliation of the freedoms of movement with fundamental rights, 
despite the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which explicitly sets out the “social 
market economy” as an objective for the Union and which provides for a binding 
effect of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights208. 
  
C. The implications of the holistic approach on the toolkit of positive 
integration: from “integration through law” to “integration through 
economics”? 
 
The evolution towards a more holistic approach integrating consumer/citizen’s 
interests is also emerging in the recent European Commission’s review of its positive 
integration programme209. In the Communication on the Citizen’s Agenda, the 
Commission noted the importance of economic integration “in making the EU 
stronger globally” but also emphasized the importance of the value of solidarity in 
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achieving the objectives of the Union210. In accordance with the objectives set by the 
Constitutive Treaties211, the Union should aim to promote a higher quality of life, 
social cohesion, environmental protection, by ensuring “citizen’s existing rights of 
access to employment, education, social services, health care and other forms of 
social protection across Europe”212. In order to achieve these aims, the Commission 
acknowledged that it has to work in partnership with national governments. The 
Commission explained in its Communication on a “single market for 21st century 
Europe” that the Internal Market must be “more responsive to the expectations and 
concerns of citizens”, “continue to bring consumer benefits in terms of lower prices, 
quality, diversity, affordability and safety of goods and services” and fostering “the 
right conditions for small and medium-sized businesses”213. The Single Market policy 
goes “hand in hand with social and environment policies to contribute to sustainable 
development goals” and needs to “encompass a strong social and environmental 
dimension”214. As it is also explained in the Commission’s Staff Working Document 
accompanying the Communication, the Single Market brought benefits to citizens “in 
the form of more choice, higher quality and lower prices” but “times have changed 
and Single Market policy should change accordingly, to ensure that it responds to the 
needs of today’s citizens”215.  
The implications of this rhetorical shift are important. First, as the Commission 
notes,  
“(m)arket opening and economic integration have social and environmental 
impacts, which must be factored in - both in Europe and abroad. This requires 
a better assessment of the impact of decisions and a better collective capacity 
to anticipate, foster and manage changes implied by greater opening and 
technological developments. This also implies getting market prices to reflect 
their real costs on society and the environment, as well as making citizens 
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more aware of the social and environmental impacts of their consumer 
choices”216. 
It is further recognized that “the ultimate objective of all economic activity is to 
provide the goods and services that citizens require in the most efficient manner”217. 
The conception of “citizens as consumers” becomes “clearly central to the Single 
Market”, which should take “more seriously” into account the distributional impact of 
the Internal Market policies, its social effects and the consumer/citizen side218.  
First, the new approach to positive market integration will be more evidence-
based and “impact-driven”, relying on a number of tools, also employed in 
competition policy, such as sector inquiries, or specific to the Single Market policy, 
such as the “consumer markets scoreboard” in order to provide information on how 
markets perform “in terms of economic and social outcomes for consumers, and 
where intervention may be needed”219. The Commission will use an “optimal mix of 
instruments”, that would combine more flexible approaches to legislation (e.g. 
Lamfalussy process) and non-binding tools (e.g. codes of conduct), as well as 
competition law and policy tools (e.g. competition advocacy) in a “synergetic manner” 
to achieve greater welfare gains for the European citizens/consumers220. 
Second, there is a move from a “more legalistic approach to a more economic 
approach” that focuses on both static (consumer choice, lower prices, better 
environmental standards) and dynamic (innovation) efficiency221. As the Commission 
explained in the Staff Working Document accompanying the Communication,  
“(i)n the past, Single Market policy was mainly about ‘integration through law’. 
The aim was to remove legal barriers to cross-border trade. This was achieved 
through ‘negative’ integration measures and ‘positive integration measures’ 
[…] In today’s context, legal integration can no longer be the Single Market’s 
sole or primary ambition”222. 
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The emphasis put on regulatory differences as a sign of success of the completion of 
the Single market is no longer the leitmotiv of the Internal Market project. For the 
Commission, “policies need to be rethought so as to ensure that markets are not only 
integrated but can function well – thereby improving consumer welfare and raising 
productivity”223.  
 Third, the Commission recognizes the importance of developing an “inclusive” 
perspective that will consider the interaction of the Internal Market project with other 
EU “and national policies, among others to address adjustment costs”224. The 
interaction with other policies does not go one way only. Inge Govaere observes that 
“social, environmental, and public health policy instruments are drafted with due 
regard to the Internal Market principles of non-discrimination and market access”, so 
as to avoid “an ex post interference of Internal Market law”; she cites the 
Commission’s Communication on “Opportunities, Access and Solidarity: Towards a 
New Social Vision for 21st Century Europe”, drawing “attention to issues of market 
access and non-discrimination in the social field” 225. The Lisbon Treaty has also 
added a broad horizontal integration provision in Article 9 of the TFEU stating that 
“(i)n defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall take into 
account requirements linked to the promotion of a high level of employment, the 
guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight against social exclusion, and a high 
level of education, training and protection of human health”226. Such a broad policy 
integration provision did not exist in the previous Treaties, albeit in some specific 
areas, such as environmental protection227. The inclusion of these provisions will 
inevitably lead the Commission and arguably the Courts to grant more importance to 
broader public interest concerns than the facilitation of intra-community trade. 
The success of a holistic approach requires, however, important institutional 
changes in particular for the interaction between public authorities at the EU, at the 
national and local level. Enhancing administrative cooperation between the different 
players is a key priority in the Commission’s new Internal Market strategy. Following 
a paradigm that has flourished in the enforcement of competition law, national 
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administrations are included in a variety of networks228 in the area of goods, services, 
consumer protection, social policy area, where they exchange information with each 
other229. The Services Directive is a good example of this new approach that 
promotes cooperation, communication and exchange of information, by including an 
entire section, Chapter VI, on administrative cooperation between Member States, 
and by providing mechanisms for mutual assistance and joint monitoring230. 
There is the perception that national action is a complement to EU action. The 
idea of a “partnership” between Member States and the EU Institutions, of a “joint 
venture” in which Member States “have a shared stake” is the new rhetoric advanced 
by the Commission231, in opposition to the prevalent perception in EU integration 
theory that Member States and the Union have antagonistic interests, in particular 
with regard to the enforcement of the Internal Market rules. This partnership 
approach “goes beyond the already established cooperation in a number of single 
market policy areas” and “requires establishing and maintaining closer cooperation 
within and between the Member States, and with the Commission, in all areas that 
are relevant for the single market” and “implies that Member States assume shared 
responsibility for and therefore a more proactive role in managing the single 
market”232. The Member States are thus encouraged to “carry out regular evaluation 
and assessment of national legislation to ensure full compliance with single market 
rules and in so doing keep under review any use of exemptions or derogations 
provided for in existing single market rules”233. A holistic approach also requires the 
broadening of the stakeholder’s involvement in the management and monitoring of 
the Internal Market. The creation of European consumer centres, the points of single 
contact in the Services Directive234, setting consumer complaints networks or Single 
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market centres or the inclusion of users in advisory panels increase considerably the 
possibilities of participation of consumers in the management of the Internal Market.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
 The decoupling of the economic from the social dimension, as the choice of 
the term “economic integration” illustrates, has long been considered le “pêché 
originel” of the legal construction of Europe235. This has profoundly influenced the 
idea of “economic integration” and largely explains the dominance of technocratic 
over political institutions in the first decades of the European integration. But as the 
recent case law of the ECJ on fundamental freedoms and the Commission’s Single 
Market for the 21st Century Communication illustrate, the embeddedness of the 
economic and the social dimensions236 becomes increasingly recognized and is 
progressively shaping a different kind of EU law, from what we were used to, during 
the formative decades of the Internal Market project. This evolution sets important 
challenges to the traditional concept of “economic integration”. Integration cannot 
refer simply to an erosion of regulatory differences by the application of negative 
integration rules or the European (federal) harmonization of national regulatory 
standards. I can identify two alternative but certainly not exhaustive meanings of the 
concept of integration. The concept of “economic integration” has been a marking 
element of post-war economic thinking over trade and international economic 
relations237. The concept suffered from an “abundance of mutually contradictory 
definitions”238, perhaps because of its dual essence: integration can be conceived of 
                                                 
235
 Fritz Scharpf, ‘The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity’, (2002) 40 
Journal of Common Market Studies 645. See also, Christian Joerges, ‘A New-Alliance of de-
legalization and legal formalism? Reflections on responses to the social deficit of the European 
integration process’, (2008) 19 Law Critique 235. 
236
 Marc Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure : The problem of Embeddedness, (1985) 
91(3) American Journal of Sociology 481. 
237
 On the emergence of the theory of international economic integration see, Fritz Machlup, A History 
of Thought on Economic Integration, Macmillan Press, 1977), noting that the term was first employed 
in business economics. Economists in the inter-war era employed the negative noun of “disintegration” 
of the world economy, probably as a consequence of the national protectionist legislation that followed 
the economic crisis of 1929. The positive noun of “integration” was first employed after the Second 
World War in order to provide a conceptual vehicle for the efforts of “integration of the Western 
European economy”, the substance of which “would be the formation of a single large market within 
which quantitative restrictions on the movements of goods, monetary barriers to the flow of payments 
and, eventually, all tariffs are permanently swept away”: Fritz Machlup (above, at p. 11) referring to 
Paul Hoffmann’s official pronouncement to the Council of the Organisation of European Economic Co-
operation on October 31, 1949. 
238
 Fritz Machlup, A History of Thought on Economic Integration, Macmillan Press, 1977), at 13. 
 69 
 
as a process, encompassing “measures designed to abolish discrimination between 
economic units belonging to different national states”, as well as a state of affairs, 
represented by “the absence of various forms of discrimination between national 
economies”239. Its meaning has been framed by the tensions between the “liberalist” 
(market friendly) and the dirigist (state intervention friendly) ideals that characterized 
the political landscape of the post-war era240. The development of the twin concepts 
of negative and positive integration, coined by Tinbergen in 1965241, and seen as 
complementary tools to remove discrimination and restrictions of movement in order 
to enable the market to function effectively, while promoting other broader policy 
objectives, was seen as a necessary compromise in order to make “economic 
integration” acceptable to both camps. The different “stages of integration”, identified 
by Balassa242, as well as the distinction of the concept of “integration” from that of 
“cooperation”243, were also inspired by the same narrative of removing barriers and 
achieving regulatory sameness to the point that they attracted the criticism that their 
final stage, the unitary state, was “misconceived” for being inspired “by a centralist 
rather than federal state model”244. Despite the absence of an authoritative definition 
of the term, Fritz Machlup noted in 1977 that a wide consensus existed as to the 
three essential conditions for economic integration: “economic integration refers 
basically to division of labour”, “it involves mobility of goods or factors”, “it is related to 
discrimination or non-discrimination in the treatment of goods and factors”245. 
The main difficulty with this conceptualization of integration is that it does not 
accommodate the need for diversity, which can improve the satisfaction of idealized 
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(not just revealed) preferences (efficiency). Efficiency is perceived here as going 
beyond allocative and productive efficiency. By bringing in the economics of 
federalism as an additional analytical tool valuing diversity, economic integration 
theorists attempted a re-conceptualization of the term that will make it more politically 
acceptable to the EU member States and to the expected aspirations of the newly 
formed European citizenry246. However, I argued in this study that this can be a risky 
analytical venture: once the need for diversity brings into the concept of economic 
integration a broader set of values than the more instrumental one of removing 
barriers to exchange, the concept loses its distinctive character and becomes 
confined to that of efficiency, broadly conceived. The question becomes then to 
identify a measure of success for this kind of “economic integration”. One could 
possibly imagine integration as a continuous and never-ending process of balancing 
of the different interests in presence (integration as a process) but such a concept of 
integration will be devoted of purpose and thus semantically empty, not to mention 
unfit from a policy prescription perspective247. 
 One could note the revolution brought to the conceptual edifice of “economic 
integration” by the principle of “mutual recognition”, a major innovation of the 
European judiciary in Cassis de Dijon. Perceived initially as a tool of negative 
integration working alongside the broad “obstacles to trade” approach in defining 
restrictions of trade, the principle of mutual recognition has evolved towards a 
mechanism of re-allocation of jurisdictional authority, “a hybrid at the intersection of 
both processes” (market access and harmonization)248. Based on mutual trust, 
among regulators, mutual recognition becomes the “core paradigm” of “economic 
integration”, the “starting assumption” before determining the need for “a policed 
national treatment” or “harmonization”249. This evolution displaces the uni-
dimensional focus of integration theory on the erosion of barriers to exchange that 
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underpinned the market access versus harmonization dilemma. Mutual recognition 
defies this paradigm and suggests a different perspective on economic integration, 
which is conceived as a process of building increased levels of “institutional-based” 
trust (or “system trust”) between actors interacting across national boundaries250. The 
emphasis on the constitutive element of trust (always residual in a jurisdictional 
transaction) integrates some degree of marginalist thinking in integration theory that 
contrasts with the overall significance the classic integration theory accords to the 
erosion of barriers to exchange, to the point that the different stages of integration 
are conceived as a continuum going from the existence of barriers to the absence of 
barriers to trade. The implications of such an approach for understanding the current 
evolution of the EU law on Internal Market are substantial, as this study has 
illustrated with the analysis of the case law of the European Courts and the legislative 
efforts in the area of the free movement of goods.  
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